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“The concepts of people, their mindsets, are 
in many cases more important for the 
direction of economic policy than the 
economic facts themselves.” 
(Walter Eucken (1952), Grundsätze der 
Wirtschaftspolitik) 
1. General Overview 
 
Economic theory provides us with knowledge on economic facts. This 
knowledge is also drawn upon in making recommendations for 
political decision makers and thus contributes to the implementation 
of policies which are designed to help increase welfare. However, 
political decision makers face the problem of depending on voter 
acceptance. In turn, this acceptance depends on the voters’ 
understanding of the benefits associated with the economic and 
political measure in question. The present dissertation therefore 
addresses the perspective of the voter by focusing on two phenomena 
which play a central role in the implementation of economic and 
political reform measures, namely biases in the perception of the 
economy and the stability of peoples’ concepts on the economy. Both 
phenomena are important for political decision makers. Biases in the 
perception of the economy may contribute to the rejection of reform 
measures which from an economist’s point of view are reasonable. A 
stability of peoples’ concepts of the economy would implicate that it is 
extremely difficult to modify inadequate beliefs which may be based 
on biased perceptions of the economy.   
Based on the example of economic growth, Chapter 2 discusses the 
problem of biases in the perception of the economy. In a series of four 
experiments, economic laypeople were required to estimate long-term 
economic growth. Study 1 revealed clear underestimations of true 
values for growth rates above 1%. In Study 2, the effect of presenting 
the task in the context of a financial investment scenario was 
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investigated. Estimates were found to be slightly more accurate than 
in the economic growth scenario. Study 3 examined the influence of 
expertise on the accuracy of estimations. While experts provided more 
accurate estimations than laypeople, they also tended to 
underestimate true values. No effect of incentives, but a positive 
influence of the need for cognition on the accuracy of estimations was 
observed. Male participants were further found to provide more 
accurate estimates than female participants. Study 4 used the so-
called thinking aloud method to gain deeper insight into the reasons 
for the observed underestimations. Underestimations were found to 
be the result of a common application of inappropriate solution 
procedures. 
Chapter 3 addresses the stability of lay beliefs on the economy, even 
in the light of evidence of a clearly contradictory nature, using the 
example of the euro introduction. Based on the framework of the 
Theory of Lay Epistemics, 156 replies to a newspaper article which 
contradicted the belief that the introduction of the euro was 
inflationary were subject to content analysis. According to this 
theory, five different reactions were predicted which should promote 
high perceived inflation despite counter persuasive evidence. As 
expected, these five reactions appeared more frequently when 
subjects were convinced that the introduction of the euro was 
inflationary. 
Finally, Chapter 4 examines the interplay of biases in the perception 
of economic phenomena and belief perseverance based on the 
example of a value added tax increase in Germany at the beginning of 
2007. In a within-subjects design, two surveys were carried out; one 
two months prior to and the other two months following the value 
added tax increase. 307 participants were required to judge the 
actual, prospective and past prices of eight products. In the first 
survey, remarkable price increases of approximately 10% were 
expected, and there were no differences in expectation between 
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products affected and those not affected by the value added tax 
increase. Although perceived price increases in the second survey 
were lower (around 5%) than the expected increases in the first 
survey, there were once again no differences in the perceived price 
increase of products affected and those not affected by the value 
added tax increase. Perceived price increases were further found to 
substantially deviate from real price development as measured by the 
German Federal Statistical Office, thus indicating that biased 
expectations of price increases prior to the value added tax increase 
significantly influenced perceived price increases following the value-
added tax increase.  
However, before addressing the subsequent chapters in detail, it 
would appear useful to mention a central methodological challenge 
when dealing with lay perceptions of economic phenomena, and to 
discuss the extent to which these difficulties were considered in the 
present dissertation. 
A central problem when discussing biased perceptions of economic 
phenomena or the formation and perseverance of inaccurate beliefs  
is the necessity for comparison with an objective and valid reality. A 
discussion of these aspects only appears worthwhile given that 
perceptional phenomena or beliefs can be compared to the way things 
“really” are. Yet whether economics as a science is principally able to 
adequately describe how the economy really works appears at the 
very least questionable. This becomes clear when considering that 
even professional economists very often disagree about the right 
economic policy (Fetchenhauer & Haferkamp, 2007). From this 
perspective, it could even be argued that biases in the perception of 
and belief formation on the economy do not exist. Such an extreme 
position can be derived from Moscovici (1984), who concludes from 
his Theory of Social Representations that biases are nothing other 
than differences in perspective between heterogeneous individuals or 
groups. Biases therefore do not necessarily express a social or 
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cognitive deficit but rather a normal difference in perspective between 
heterogeneous individuals or groups within a society.    
In order to circumnavigate the problems connected with this issue, 
the studies in the present dissertation focused on phenomena which 
could be compared to mathematically true values, such as the 
estimation of long-term economic growth. A further technique 
adopted in dealing with this problem was relying on the work of the 
German Federal Statistical Office and the fact that this institution is 
able to provide more or less accurate measurements of price 
development. Although measuring inflation rates using baskets of 
commodities may be associated with certain difficulties, for example 
refined products (DESTATIS, 2003), this official price information was 
selected for use given that it appears, on the whole, to closely reflect 
“real” price development. It must nonetheless be critically noted that 
correctly capturing objective reality when dealing with lay perception 
and lay beliefs on the economy may often prove extremely difficult, 
thus constraining fields of research in which some measure of 
objective reality or an appropriate surrogate is required. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are intended for submission to future 
publications, or already submitted, respectively, and can therefore be 
read separately. 
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2. The illusion of living in a linear world – How 
laypeople and experts underestimate the 
effect of economic growth 
2.1. Introduction 
Imagine two countries, A and B, with the same initial level of wealth. 
If it is assumed that country A shows zero growth over the next years 
and country B grows with an annual growth rate of 5%, how long 
would it take country B to double its initial level of wealth compared 
to country A? 
The answer is that it would take country B only slightly more than 14 
years to double its initial level of wealth compared to country A. A 
closer look at current statistics on growth rates (e. g. EUROSTAT, 
2007) clarifies that it is not difficult to fill the labels “A” and “B” of the 
different countries with content. Whereas countries such as 
Denmark, France, Hungary, and Portugal had modest growth (0.5% 
to 1.6%) during recent years, countries such as Latvia, Slovakia, and 
Estonia had significantly higher growth rates (7.7% to 11.0%). The 
same applies for China, which, for a considerable time, grew with 
annual rates between 8% and 11.5% and is, therefore, assumed to 
overtake countries such as Germany very soon (Spiegel-Online, 2007) 
(at least as far as the absolute gross domestic product is concerned).  
These examples clarify that economic growth is profoundly dynamic 
and that different growth rates in different countries are suited to 
change the meaning and wealth of different economies within 
relatively short time frames. Therefore, these examples are also suited 
to demonstrate the importance of economic growth and, therefore, of 
political measures aimed to stimulate economic growth for a 
particular country. Nonetheless, such political measures require the 
acceptance of the voters. This acceptance, in turn, should depend on 
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the voters’ ability to understand the impact of economic growth in the 
long run and the meaning of higher or lower growth rates.  
For this reason, in a series of four studies, the degree to which people 
are able to understand and estimate the dynamics behind economic 
growth and what influences the accuracy of their estimations were 
examined. The main question the participants were asked to answer 
in all four studies was: “What is the overall rise in national income 
within the next 25 years if the economy rises with an annual rate of 
5%?” The true answer to this question is 238.64%, which is 
calculated according to the following formula: 
[( 1 + 0.05 ) 25 - 1] * 100        (1) 
Hand on heart, would you have provided a reasonably accurate 
estimation? If not, you are in good company since it is a ubiquitious 
phenomenon that people have enormous difficulties correctly 
predicting the future. For example, terms such as presentism 
(Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002) or projection bias (Loewenstein & 
Angner, 2003) both describe the general phenomenon that people rely 
too much on current states when prediciting the future. Based on 
these general phenomena, it is, therefore, not a surprising finding 
that previous research dealing with estimations of exponential growth 
rates suggests enormous difficulties when it comes to predicting the 
outcome of exponential growth in the future. 
In a classical experiment by Wagenaar and Sagaria (1975), 
participants were asked to extrapolate a hypothetical development of 
pollution, which was presented in table form. The remarkable finding 
was that two-thirds of the participants drastically underestimated the 
true value of 25.000 and provided estimations lower than 2.500, 
reaching only 10% or less of the true value. Very similar results were 
found in a study by Benzion, Granot, and Yagil (1992) using the 
example of financial investments. In this study, participants were 
asked to estimate the end value of a money investment of $100 for 
various durations and interest rates. Beside the fact that the end 
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values and, therefore, the exponential growth rates were clearly 
underestimated, it was also found that the underestimations were 
clearly increased with the length of the duration and with the 
magnitude of the interest rate. Even though these findings suggest 
that the tendency to underestimate exponential effects becomes even 
stronger with longer periods, the findings from Wagenaar and Sagaria 
(1975) clarify that this tendency also appears when relatively short 
time frames of five years are considered. 
One could now object that the underestimations are possibly rooted 
in people’s difficulties when dealing with numerical information. This 
should, in particular, be the case when people must deal with 
percentages (e. g., Paulos, 1988), for example, when estimating 
economic growth in the long run. 
In another study, however, Wagenaar and Timmers (1979) used the 
so-called pond-and-duckweed problem to investigate participants’ 
ability to estimate exponential growth rates in a non-numerical 
manner. Participants were exposed to a square, which represented a 
pond. This pond included 256 small squares, which represented 
duckweed. The duckweed and, therefore, the number of small 
squares grew with a constant growth rate, indicating the exponential 
growth. Most subjects heavily overestimated the time it would take 
until the duckweed would overgrow the whole pond. It was, therefore, 
shown that participants’ tendency to underestimate exponential 
effects is not only a function of lacking numerical abilities, but it also 
appears when they are confronted with concrete and obvious 
processes. 
To summarize, it has been shown that most people tend to 
underestimate the effects of exponential growth rates in a number of 
different domains. According to our knowledge, however, whether this 
general finding extends to the effects of different levels of growth rates 
on the economic wealth of a given country has not been tested. This 
question is addressed in Study 1, which examines how far findings 
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from previous research (e.g., Wagenaar & Sagaria, 1975; Dörner, 
Kimber, & Kimber, 1997) can be transferred to the context of 
economic growth. Study 2 examines the influence of the setting of the 
estimation task and, therefore, to what degree a lack of ability to 
transfer the logic behind exponential effects to the context of 
economic growth may account for possible underestimations. Study 3 
aims to discover what influences the quality of the estimations by 
addressing to what degree expertise is suited to improve accuracy. 
Additionally, motivational effects are examined, which were either 
induced experimentally (using incentives) or based on individual 
dispositions (considering the influence of the personality trait need 
for cognition). Finally, Study 4 aims to gain insight into the mental 
processes and possible sources of errors underlying the solution of 
the estimation task dealing with economic growth by using the 
thinking-aloud method. 
2.2. Study 1  
Based on findings from previous research, it was expected that 
people, in general, would tend to underestimate economic growth in 
the long run. Furthermore, it was expected that this tendency would 
become stronger with rising growth rates. Therefore, this study used 
various growth rates, ranging from 1% to 5%. Participants were asked 
to estimate the overall growth in national income in 25 years. 
2.2.1. Method 
2.2.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 80 students  from the Faculty of Management, 
Economics, and Social Sciences of the University of Cologne in an 
advanced study period. Therefore, it was expected that they would be 
familiar with economic phenomena in general and also with economic 
growth and exponential effects because their curricula contain 
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(among others) various courses dealing with financial investments 
and even a course dealing with growth theory. 
The main part of this sample consisted of students of business 
administration (73.8%) and economics (12.5%). The remaining 
participants were students of social sciences and health economics. 
2.2.1.2. Procedure 
The experiment was carried out in an introductory lecture on 
economic and social psychology. The participants were requested to 
fill out a questionnaire and answer all questions in any case, even in 
case of uncertainty. Furthermore, they were requested not to talk to 
their neighbors and not to use calculators. Using a between-subjects 
design, the questionnaire started with the question, “What is the 
overall rise in national income within the next 25 years if the economy 
rises with an annual rate of 1% (or 3%, or 5%, respectively)?” 
Afterwards, they were asked to fill in their course of study. The 
debriefing with a short discussion of the results took place in the 
following lecture. 
2.2.2.  Results and discussion 
Based on the theoretical considerations, it was expected that the 
participants would clearly tend to underestimate the true values, at 
least for the 3% and 5% growth rate. Furthermore, the inaccuracy of 
the estimations was expected to increase with the magnitude of the 
growth rates due to a stronger impact of exponential effects.  
First, a remarkable range of estimations was observed,  ranging from 
0% to 130% for the 1% growth rate, from 0% to 300% for the 3% 
growth rate, and from 0% to 400% for the 5% growth rate. A 
subsequent Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for all growth rates was not 
signicant at a 5% significance level, thus indicating that the 
estimations were approximately normally distributed. A closer look at 
Figure 1 reveals that, with the exception of the 1% growth rate, 
participants clearly tended to underestimate the true values and that 
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the inaccuracy of the estimations increased with the magnitude of the 
growth rates.  
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Figure 1: Mean Estimations and True Values for a 1%, 3%, and 5% Growth-
Rate 
For the 1% growth rate, the mean estimated value of 34.14% did not 
significantly differ from the true value of 28.24%, t(26) = .82. 
Accordingly, our expectation that participants would provide quite 
accurate estimations for a low growth rate was confirmed. It appears 
that, for this growth rate, the exponential effects were still within a 
conceivable range for the participants. 
The situation however differed for the 3% and 5% growth rates. For 
the 3% growth rate, the mean estimated value of 72.48% was found 
to be a significant underestimation of the true value of 109.38%, t(26) 
= 2.53, p < .05. As expected, this inaccuracy became even stronger 
for the 5% growth rate. Here, the mean estimated value of 78.54% 
represents an extreme underestimation of the true value of 238.64%, 
t(23) = 9.04, p < .01. These findings indicate that, as expected, the 
underestimation became stronger with the rising impact of 
exponential effects, which were strongest for the 5% growth rate. In 
sum, it was found that people were quite good in estimating economic 
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growth for a low growth rate of 1%. However, this situation 
dramatically differed with rising growth rates.   
A subsequent ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the growth 
rates on the estimated values, F(2, 75) = 3.18, p < .05, η² = .08, but a 
subsequent Games-Howell post-hoc test revealed only marginally 
significant differences between the estimations for the 1% growth rate 
and the estimations for the 3% growth rate or the estimations for the 
5% growth rate, respectively (ps < .10). At the same time, no 
significant difference was observed between the estimations for the 
3% and 5% growth rates. This indicates that these estimations were 
quite similar, which is a remarkable finding because there is a 
129.26% difference between the true values. Therefore, it appears as 
though people become increasingly helpless with rising growth rates. 
2.3. Study 2 
Study 1 revealed a strong tendency to underestimate the cumulative 
effects of economic growth rates over a longer period of time. A 
possible explanation for this tendency could be that some 
participants simply did not recognize that economic growth underlies 
the effect of exponentiality, such as in financial investments, for 
example. For this reason, Study 2 aimed to replicate this main 
finding from Study 1 in the context of financial investments. The 
basic assumption was that, in general, participants are more familiar 
with compound interest effects and the corresponding exponential 
growth in a financial investment setting. Therefore, it was expected 
that those participants who were not capable of transferring their 
knowledge on exponential effects in a financial investment setting to 
an economic growth setting would tend to provide lower estimations 
in the economic growth setting due to the negligence of exponential 
effects. 
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2.3.1.  Method 
2.3.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 293 students (129 females, 164 males) of different 
courses of study who were randomly recruited on the campus. One 
participant was removed from the subsequent data analysis because 
he provided only an estimate for the financial investment setting. 
Furthermore, because there was no upper limit for the range of the 
estimations, we had to deal with the problem of outliers. It was 
decided to follow a common procedure to deal with outliers and to 
exclude estimations beyond a range of three standard deviations (see 
for example Roth & Switzer, 2002). For this reason, 5 participants 
were excluded from analysis, though the central results were also 
obtained when the outliers were not removed from the sample. 
2.3.1.2. Procedure 
The participants were asked if they were willing to participate in a 
survey dealing with the psychology of economic growth, and they 
were told that they could participate in a lottery. If they agreed, they 
were given the questionnaire and told that they were not allowed to 
use any devices such as calculators. In the questionnaire, the 
participants were informed that they were about to answer two 
estimation tasks and that they should anwer these tasks in all cases, 
even in case of uncertainty. The sequence of the two estimation tasks 
(economic growth versus financial investment setting) was 
randomized to control for sequence effects; however, no such effects 
occurred. Then, the participants were asked to answer the question, 
“What is the overall rise in national income within the next 25 years if 
the economy rises with an annual rate of 5%?” and the question, 
“What is the overall growth of a money investment of 100 Euro within 
the next 25 years if there is an annual interest rate of 5%?” Each 
question was presented on a separate page to avoid possible 
influences of the other question. Nonetheless, the participants were 
allowed to page forward/back.  
13 
After answering these two questions, they were asked to decide 
whether the mathematical procedure was identical for both 
estimation tasks or not. It was found that 113 (38.15%), more than 
one-third, of the participants in fact believed that the mathematical 
procedure for both estimation tasks was not identical. 
Finally, gender, age, and course of study were recorded. Then, the 
participants were told that they could participate in a lottery in which 
four book tokens were drawn. For this purpose, they could either 
disclose their email address or telephone number. By request, the 
participants were informed about the true values of the estimation 
tasks using diagrams that showed the developments of the financial 
investment and the economic growth. 
2.3.2.  Results and Discussion 
First, it was found that the estimations were not normally 
distributed, which was confirmed in a significant Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (D = 2.98, p < .01). This was mainly due to the fact that 
low estimations and numbers such as 5, 10, 25, 30, 50, 100, 125, 
150, 200, and 300 were slightly overrepresented. Therefore, the 
estimations were assigned to seven different classes so that the 
distribution of the resulting variable, in turn, roughly equaled a 
normal distribution. Finally, all analyses were carried out with this 
variable and the raw estimations of the participants; the results were 
identical. For clarity, we present the results with the raw estimations 
of the participants. 
Compared to Study 1, an even more remarkable range of estimations 
was found, ranging from 1.5% to 600% in the economic growth 
setting and from 2.5% to 600% in the money investment setting. The 
true value of 238.64% was underestimated by 92.1% of the 
participants in the economic growth setting and by 90.8% in the 
money investment setting. It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
mean estimated value in the economic growth setting, M = 82.76, SD 
= 93.56, t(292) = 28.47, p < .01, and the mean estimated value in the 
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financial investment setting, M = 89.55, SD = 95.79, t(292) = 26.42, p 
< .01, were significantly lower than the true value of 238.64%. This 
replicated the effect of underestimation from Study 1 for the 5% 
growth rate. Furthermore, it was found that this effect also appeared 
when participants were asked to judge the end value of a financial 
investment, thus indicating that a more familiar setting does not 
prevent participants’ underestimation. 
It was, however, assumed that a higher familiarity with compound 
interest effects in the financial investment setting would lead at least 
to more accurate estimations compared to the economic growth 
setting. This notion was tested with a repeated measures ANOVA 
using the within-subjects factor setting (economic growth versus 
financial investment) and the between-subjects factor mathematical 
procedure, which captured if participants believed the underlying 
mathematical procedure in both settings were identical or not. 
Furthermore, the between-subjects factor gender was considered. The 
following main effects proved to be significant: the estimations in the 
financial investment setting were higher than in the economic growth 
setting, and males made better estimations than females. 
Furthermore, a significant interaction between setting and 
mathematical procedure was observed. 
As expected, a closer comparison of the whole sample revealed a 
significant difference between the estimations in the economic growth 
and the financial investment setting, F(1, 288) = 13.87, p < .01, η² = 
.05. Accordingly, participants’ estimates in the economic growth 
setting reached an average of only 82.76% (SD = 93.56), whereas the 
estimates in the financial investment setting reached an average of 
89.76% (SD = 95.89). 
Nonetheless, a difference in the estimations for the two settings was 
expected to occur for only those participants who believed that the 
mathematical procedure was not identical. Not surprisingly, a 
significant interaction between setting and mathematical procedure 
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was found, F(1, 288) = 13.94, p < .01, η² = .05. Figure 2 substantiates 
this interaction. Hence, those participants who believed that both 
mathematical procedures were identical, in fact, provided very similar 
mean estimations of 94.34% (SD = 104.11) for the financial 
investment setting and 94.46% (SD = 106.18) for the economic 
growth setting. In contrast, the participants who believed that both 
mathematical procedures were not identical provided higher mean 
estimations of 82.50% (SD = 81.09) in the financial investment 
setting than in the economic growth setting, where the estimations 
reached only 64.23% (SD = 65.28). This finding clarifies that the 
magnitude of the estimations was influenced by the setting, but only 
for those 113 participants (38.15%) who believed that both 
mathematical procedures were not identical. 
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Figure 2: Mean Estimations for the Economic Growth and Financial 
Investment Setting for Participants who believed that the Mathematical 
Procedures were and were not identical, respectively. 
Furthermore, substantial gender effects were observed, F(1, 288) = 
7.32, p < .01, η² = .03. Male participants provided substantially 
higher and therefore better estimations (economic growth: M = 
99.46%, SD = 101.80; financial investment: M = 112.74%, SD = 
103.19) than female participants (economic growth: M = 69.74%, SD 
= 84.65; financial investment: M = 71.82%, SD = 85.90). Therefore, it 
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appears as though female participants are more greatly affected by 
the tendency to underestimate exponential effects than male 
participants. 
The analyses thus far indicate that most participants are wrong when 
they estimate cumulative growth in the long run. The results also 
indicate that most participants tend to underestimate the true 
values. However, 21 (7.16%) participants overestimated the true 
value in the economic growth setting, and 25 (8.53%) overestimated 
the true value in the financial investment setting. It could be that a 
considerable number of male participants provided estimations of 
350% or higher. This, in turn, could also have contributed to higher, 
but not necessarily better, estimations by male participants. To 
consider the effects of overestimation, a second dependent variable, 
valid estimations, was introduced. For the generation of this variable, 
the estimations in the financial investment and the economic growth 
setting, respectively, were assigned to two different categories in a 
first step. The first category included more or less accurate 
estimations, lying within a range of 50% less and 50% more than the 
true value of 238.64%. All remaining estimations were assigned to a 
second category, including more or less inaccurate estimations. 
Consequently, 19 (6.5%) participants who provided accurate 
estimations for both settings were assigned to the category valid 
estimations, whereas 274 (93.5%) participants who provided 
inaccurate estimations in one or both of the two settings were 
assigned to the category nonvalid estimations.   
In a subsequent binary logistic regression analysis with the 
dependent variable valid estimations and the independent variables 
mathematical procedure (identical/not identical) and gender, 
significant positive logit coefficients for mathematical procedure (b = 
1.20, p < .05) and gender (b =.97, p < .01) were observed. A closer 
look at the odds ratio in Table 1 shows that participants who believed 
that the mathematical procedure was identical had a 3.30-fold higher 
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chance of providing valid estimations. Male participants had a 2.64-
fold higher chance of providing valid estimations. 
Table 1: Summary of Binary Logistic Regression Analysis. Regression 
Coefficients for Mathematical Procedure and Gender predicting Valid 
Estimations in Both Settings 
 
Variables b 
 
SE b 
 
Wald 
 
OR 
 
OR 95% CI 
Mathematical 
Procedure     1.20** 
 
.51 
 
5.53 
 
3.30 
 
(1.22 – 8.94) 
Gender       .97*** .32 9.12 2.64 (1.41 – 4.96) 
Constant   –3.57*** .49     53.65  .03  
 
Note. OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval 
Nagelkerkes R² = .21. -2 log likelihood = 115.77. Correctly classified = 93.5%. 
The dependent variable Valid Estimations in both settings was coded with 0 = No Valid Estimations 
and 1 = Valid Estimations. The independent variable Mathematical Procedure was coded with 0 = not 
identical and 1 = identical. The independent variable Gender was coded with 0 = Female and 1 = 
Male.  
*p < .10, **p < .05, *** p < .01 
It is, therefore, not a surprising finding that 18% of the male 
participants who believed that the mathematical procedures were 
identical, in fact, provided valid estimations for both settings. On the 
contrary, none of the female participants who believed that the 
mathematical procedures were identical were able to deliver valid 
estimations in both settings. This replicates the findings from the 
ANOVA discussed in the section above. 
In sum, it was found that the result from Study 1 could be replicated, 
both in an economic growth setting and in a financial investment 
setting. It was further found that those participants who were not 
capable of transferring their knowledge on exponential effects from a 
financial investment setting to an economic growth setting provided 
lower estimations in the latter setting. Evidence for this result was 
also found in the debriefing, as one participant told us: “These 
diagrams remind me of diagrams, that a guy from an insurance 
company has shown me. I cannot believe these things at all. Above 
all, I wonder what these things have to do with economic growth.” 
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2.4. Study 3 
A subsequent question of interest is what influences the accuracy of 
people’s estimations. An important factor could be the expertise of 
people with the estimation of exponential growth. It seems plausible 
that familiarity with phenomena underlying the logic of exponential 
effects should result in a higher ability to estimate economic growth 
in the long run. However, the findings from previous research are not 
clear. Benzion, Shachmurive, and Yagil (2004) examined whether or 
not participants owning money investments differ from participants 
without money investments when it comes to estimating future 
values of money investments, but no such differences were observed. 
In one experiment, Wagenaar and Sagaria (1975), found that subjects 
who were assumed to have daily experience with growth processes 
also tended to underestimate the effects of exponential growth. 
Nonetheless, in another experiment, one of two groups of students 
was instructed on the characteristics of expontial growth and 
informed that people tend to underestimate exponential effects. 
Subsequently, the participants had to solve an extrapolation task. 
Although this group also tended to underestimate the true values, the 
estimations were better than the estimations from a control group of 
students who were not instructed (Wagenaar & Sagaria, 1975).  
Similar results were found in a study by Eisenstein and Hoch (2005), 
who found that people may, in fact, provide significantly better 
estimations if they are trained in the logic behind exponential growth. 
After participants had received a specific training on how to calculate 
exponentional effects, the estimations became twice as good as 
previous ones. Finally, Keren (1983) found that daily experience with 
exponential growth rates improves the accuracy of estimations. 
According to his findings, people who regularly have to deal with high 
inflation rates are able to provide more accurate estimations on 
exponential effects. Based on all of these previous findings, it was 
expected that participants with expertise in dealing with exponential 
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growth rates should, in fact, provide more accurate estimations than 
participants without expertise. For this reason, Study 3 considers 
differences between participants more and less familiar with 
exponential growth.  
Another explanation for the remarkable underestimation of 
exponential effects in Study 1 and Study 2 could be rooted in lacking 
motivation. In particular, many economists share the view that 
experimental tasks have to matter to the participants to obtain 
proper data (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; Rydval & Ortmann, 2004). 
For example, Smith and Walker (1993) state that increased financial 
rewards contribute to more rational behavior of the participants and 
reduce the variance of data. Nonetheless, other authors stress the 
importance of cognitive abilities (e. g., Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). 
Following a review of 74 experiments, these authors conclude that 
when looking at the modal results, no effect of incentives on 
performance is found. Accordingly, depending on the task, cognitive 
abilities may play a more central role for the outcomes of experiments 
than incentives. In line with this deliberation, Jenkins et al. (1998) 
found in a meta-analysis with 47 studies from applied psychology 
journals that incentives lead to quantitative effects on the output in 
simple tasks. However, no effects on the quality of performance were 
observed in this meta-analysis. These studies argue in favor of the 
importance of cognitive abilities when estimating economic growth in 
the long run. It was, therefore, expected that the effects of incentives 
on the accuracy of the estimations would be rather low. Nonetheless, 
because of a controversial discussion on the efficacy of incentives, 
Study 3 examined to what extent incentives cause more accurate 
estimations. 
Yet another motivational effect could be rooted in interindividual 
motivational differences. It could be that some people display a 
stronger dispositional motivation than others when it comes to 
solving such estimation tasks. An appropriate personality measure to 
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capture the engagement and pleasure associated with the solving of 
brainteasers is the need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). For 
this reason, Study 3 wanted to extend previous research by 
considering to what extent this personality trait accounts for 
interindividual differences in the accuracy of the estimations. It was 
expected that the motivation in consequence of a strong need for 
cognition leads to a higher familiarity with the solving of complex and 
abstract tasks in general. This familiarity should, in turn, contribute 
to the application of more appropriate solution strategies. For this 
reason, it was expected that participants high in need for cognition 
would provide more accurate estimations.  
Finally, Study 3 aimed to find possible explanations for the gender 
effect observed in Study 2. One possible explanation for this effect is 
that women are, in general, less interested in politics and economics. 
This, in turn, could contribute to a misunderstanding of the meaning 
of economic growth, which could explain why the impact of economic 
growth in the long run was more likely to be underestimated by 
female participants. In fact, a nationwide survey in 2002 found that 
the political interest of women is lower than the political interest of 
men (GESIS, 2002). Hence, it might be that the gender effect 
identified in Study 2 could, at least in part, be explained by 
differences in the general interest in political and economical 
questions. For this reason, Study 3 also considered the influence of a 
general interest in politics and economics and whether this interest 
explains the gender effects observed in Study 2. 
2.4.1.  Method 
2.4.1.1. Participants 
The entire sample consisted of 402 students. Thereof, 180 (79 
females, 101 males) were advanced students of economics and 
business administration. Their curricula contain (among others) 
various courses dealing with financial investments and a course 
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dealing with growth theory. Therefore, it was assumed that these 
students were familiar with exponential effects and the logic behind 
economic growth rates. For this reason, this group of students served 
as experts. 
The remaining 222 students (141 females, 81 males) attended various 
courses of study (e.g., education, psychology, law). The majority of 
this group consisted of future teachers. Since the curriculums of 
these participants do not contain courses dealing with financial 
investements and growth theory, this group of students served as 
laypeople. To deal with the problem of outliers, the same procedure 
as that done in Study 2 was applied (that is, estimations going 
beyond a range of three standard deviations were excluded). 
2.4.1.2. Procedure 
The participants were randomly asked on the campus if they were 
interested in participating in an experimental study. After the 
participants agreed to participate, they were asked for their course of 
studies. To ensure that the students of economics and business 
administration were “real” experts, only those from an advanced 
study period were recruited. Then, the participants were lead into a 
laboratory with four computers and each participant was placed in 
front of a computer. The experimental procedure began, and the 
participants were electronically guided through the questionnaire, 
which started with a general introduction of how to complete the 
different questions. Then, they were asked to answer the items from 
the need for cognition scale. Subsequently, the estimation task was 
introduced. The participants were requested to answer this question 
in all cases, even in case of uncertainty. In the winning condition, 
they were additionally informed that the best estimation was 
rewarded with 100 euro, the second best with 50 euro, the third best 
with 25 euro, and the fourth best with 10 euro. In the non-winning 
condition, only the estimation task was introduced. Then, they were 
asked to solve the 5% estimation task by answering the question, 
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“What is the overall rise in national income within the next 25 years if 
the economy rises with an annual rate of 5%?”  
Finally, questions concerning interest in politics and economics, 
gender, age, and the course of study were asked. Additionally, the 
participants in the winning-condition were asked for their email 
addresses to ensure the possibility of informing them in case they 
won a prize for a good estimation. Finally, the participants were 
debriefed by the experimenters. 
2.4.1.3. Measurements 
To measure the need for cognition, the German version (Bless, 
Wänke, Bohner, Fellhauer, & Schwarz, 1994) of the need for 
cognition scale originally developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982) was 
used. This scale aims to measure the engagement and pleasure 
associated with the solving of brainteasers. This scale proved to be a 
reliable measure, with α = .85. 
Interest in politics and economics was measured with a self-
developed scale, including seven items such as “I enjoy dealing with 
issues of economic policy” or “I am reading the business section of a 
newspaper regularly”. This scale also proved to be a reliable measure, 
with α = .89. 
2.4.2.  Results and Discussion 
2.4.2.1. Manipulation Check 
In a first step, whether the chance of winning up to 100 euro 
provided the desired incentive was controlled. An indirect 
manipulation check revealed that the manipulation was successful. 
When measuring the time to complete the estimation task, it was 
found that participants in the winning condition (M = 113.18, SD = 
94.65) took significantly more seconds to complete the estimation 
task than participants in the neutral condition, M = 96.26, SD = 
70.46, F(1, 400) = 4.09, p < .05, η² = .01. 
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2.4.2.2.  Effects of incentives, expertise, need for 
cognition, gender and interest in politics and 
economics 
First, it was found that, for the entire sample, the true value of 
238.64% was clearly underestimated. This was shown in a mean 
estimation of 108.99%. Furthermore, some participants appeared to 
have no clue about how to solve the task, which was demonstrated by 
the remarkable range of the estimations (from 0.5% to 650%). The 
true value of 238.64% was underestimated by 91.5% of the 
participants. All of these results replicated the findings from Studies 
1 and 2.  
For the analyses to follow, the continuous variable need for cognition 
was dichotomized using a median split. Since the distribution of this 
dichotomized variable was virtually identical for all experimental 
conditions and no significant gender differences were observed, it was 
included in an ANCOVA with the remaining factors (expertise, 
incentives, gender, and the covariate interest in politics and 
economics) to predict the dependent variable estimations. The 
following main effects proved to be significant: experts made better 
estimations than laypeople, participants scoring high on need for 
cognition made better estimates than participants scoring low on 
need for cognition, and males made better estimations than females. 
Incentives and interest in economics and politics did not influence 
the accuracy of the estimations. No interaction effects were identified. 
In fact, a significant main effect of expertise was observed, F(1, 385) = 
9.03, p < .01, η² = .02. Accordingly, the students of economics and 
business administration provided better estimates of 137.61% (SD = 
119.98) than the remaining students who served as laypeople and 
provided lower estimates of 85.79% (SD = 82.27). Furthermore, no 
significant effect of the incentives was observed, F(1, 385) = .02, thus 
indicating that the underestimations from Studies 1 and 2 were a 
result of lacking not motivation but ability. It appears that cognitive 
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abilities play a significantly more important role than the 
motivational effects of financial incentives.  
As expected, a significant influence of the need for cognition was 
observed, F(1, 385) = 4.23, p < .05, η² = .01. Whereas the mean 
estimates from participants scoring high on need for cognition 
reached 125.01% (SD = 105.58), the estimates by the participants 
scoring low on need for cognition reached only 93.75% (SD = 100.43). 
To invalidate methodological objections associated with the 
dichotomization of continuous variables, it seems worth mentioning 
that all of the results presented thus far could also be replicated with 
a regression analysis, using the continuous variable need for 
cognition. Therefore, with the need for cognition, a psychological 
variable could be identified, which is (at least to some extent) suited 
to explain why some people may be less subject to an 
underestimation of economic growth in the long run than other 
people. 
Furthermore, as in Study 2, a substantial gender effect was observed, 
which did not disappear when controlling for the slightly different 
gender distribution between experts and laypeople, F(1, 385) = 9.03, 
p < .01, η² = .02. While males’ estimates had an average of 135.54% 
(SD = 107.73), females’ average estimates reached only a value of 
87.03% (SD = 95.67).  
But to what extent could the effects observed thus far be explained by 
the interest in politics and economics? First, no significant influence 
of the covariate interest in politics and economics on the accuracy of 
the estimations was found, F(1, 385) = 1.99. It appears, therefore, 
that estimating economic growth in the long run is an abstract 
cognitive task that has nothing to do with knowledge about politics 
and economics. Furthermore, when excluding the covariate interest 
in politics and economics from the analysis, the effects reported 
above by and large remained stable. Even though it was found that 
female participants (M = 2.51, SD = .84) displayed a significantly 
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lower interest in politics and economics than male participants, M = 
3.27, SD = .97, t(361) = 8.27, p < .01, d = .83, these differences were 
(on the whole) not accountable for the gender effect. The same applies 
for the effects of expertise and need for cognition, which cannot be 
reduced to interindividual differences in interest in politics and 
economics. 
A final result of interest was differences in the time to complete the 
task. Female participants (M = 93.61, SD = .62.14) took significantly 
less time to complete the task than male participants, M = 118.79, SD 
= 103.33, t(284) = 2.88, p < .01, d = .30. A possible explanation is 
that female participants used different solution strategies when 
judging economic growth in the long run than male participants, 
which, in turn, could account for the gender differences observed in 
Studies 2 and 3. 
Finally, similar to Study 2, the estimations were not normally 
distributed, which was confirmed in a significant Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (D = 2.98, p < .01). For this reason, all analyses were 
replicated with a classified variable for the estimation consisting of 
seven classes and roughly equaling a normal distribution. Again, all 
central results could be replicated when using this procedure. 
To examine if the effects described above apply only to the effect of 
underestimation or if they can explain valid estimations in general, in 
analogy to Study 2, a second dependent variable (valid estimations) 
was introduced. Therefore, 42 participants (10.4%) were assigned to 
the first category of valid estimations, which included more or less 
accurate estimations, lying within a range of 50% less and 50% more 
than the true value of 238.64%. The remaining 360 participants 
(89.6%) were assigned to a second category of nonvalid estimations, 
including more or less inaccurate estimations. In a subsequent 
binary logistic regression analysis (including the independent 
variables incentives, expertise, need for cognition, and gender to 
predict the dependent variable valid estimations), nonsignificant logit 
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coefficients for incentives (b = –.04) and expertise (b =.25) and 
significant positive coefficients for need for cognition (b =.55, p < .01) 
and gender (b =.60, p < .01) were observed.   
Table 2: Summary of Binary Logistic Regression Analysis. Regression 
Coefficients for Predictors of Valid Estimations 
 
Variables B 
 
SE b 
 
Wald 
 
OR 
 
OR 95% CI 
Incentives       –.04 .17   .06 .96 (.69 – 1.34)  
Expertise         .25 .18 2.08      1.29   (.91 – 1.82) 
Need for 
Cognition       .55*** 
 
.19 
         
8.16 
       
     1.73 
 
(1.19 – 2.51) 
Gender       .60*** .19     10.35      1.83 (1.27 – 2.65) 
Constant   –2.46*** .21   137.89 .09  
 
Note. OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval 
Nagelkerkes R² = .14. -2 log likelihood = 241.50. Correctly classified = 89.5%. 
The dependent variable Valid Estimations was coded with 0 = No Valid Estimations and 1 = Valid 
Estimations. The independent variable Incentives was coded with 0 = no Incentives and 1 = 
Incentives. The independent variable Expertise was coded with 0 = Laypeople and 1 = Experts. The 
independent variable Need for Cognition was coded with 0 = low Need for Cognition and 1 = high 
Need for Cognition. The independent variable Gender was coded with 0 = Female and 1 = Male.  
*p < .10, **p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
A closer look at Table 2 indicates that participants with high need for 
cognition displayed a 1.73-fold higher chance of providing valid 
estimations. Additionally, male participants displayed a 1.83-fold 
higher chance of providing valid estimations. However, the logit 
coefficient for expertise was nonsignificant. Therefore, it appears that, 
even though the experts provided higher estimations than the 
laypeople, they did not necessarily provide more valid estimations, 
presumably due to overestimations. A closer look at the frequency 
distributions reveals that this was exactly the case. Whereas only 6 
laypeople (2.7%) provided estimations higher than 238.64%, 28 
experts (15.56%) overestimated the true value. 
In sum, Study 3 yielded four central results. First, it appears as 
though the underestimations from Studies 1 and 2 were not a 
consequence of lacking motivation because no effect of the incentives 
on the accuracy of the estimations was found. This supports the 
finding from Rydval and Ortmann (2004) that cognitive abilities are 
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more important than financial incentives. Second, congruent with 
some findings from previous research (e. g., Wagenaar & Sagaria, 
1975; Eisenstein & Hoch, 2005; Keren, 1983), it was found that the 
underestimation of exponential growth was, in fact, stronger for those 
participants with less expertise in dealing with economic growth and 
exponential effects (the laypeople). Nonetheless, the experts also 
displayed a stronger tendency to overestimate exponential effects. The 
results of Study 2 offered the explanation that many laypeople did 
not recognize that the estimation of economic growth in the long run 
is also based on exponential growth (as is a financial investment). 
Third, with the need for cognition, a personality variable was 
identified, which (at least to some extent) is suited to explain why 
some participants provide more accurate estimations than others. 
Fourth, the gender effect from Study 2 did not disappear when 
controlling for differences in the interest in politics and economics. 
This, and the fact that the other results also did not disappear when 
controlling for this variable, should contribute to an increased 
validity of the results obtained thus far. 
Figure 3 summarizes the central results obtained in Study 3.  
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It was found that male students of economics and business 
administration with a high need for cognition provided valid 
estimations in 27.78% of the cases, whereas this was the case for 
female students of other courses of study in only 3.75% of the cases. 
2.5. Study 4 
Thus far, Study 3 has contributed many answers to the central 
question, “What influences the accuracy of people’s estimations on 
economic growth in the long run?” However, one central question still 
remains unanswered that can, at best, be answered indirectly, 
namely: Which procedures are applied when people make such 
estimations? 
Previous research has identified inadequate calculation procedures as 
a source of error, explaining why people underestimate exponential 
effects. Based on the findings in their experiments, Wagenaar and 
Sagaria (1975) suggest that people systematically tend to 
underestimate the exponent from the exponential function. The same 
conclusion is drawn by Keren (1984), who suggests that people try to 
compensate for the underestimations due to a insufficiently high 
exponent by adding a multiplicative factor (bigger than one) to 
compensate for the low exponent. This correction is, however, not 
high enough, which finally leads to the underestimations. Benzion et 
al. (2004) concluded that their participants roughly used a linear 
function, adding an additional amount to account for the effects of 
exponentiality. 
Nonetheless, all of the studies presented fit the data to mathematical 
models and, therefore, tried to find ex post explanations for the 
underestimations. Without doubt, it appears very plausible that a 
considerable number of participants used a linear function and 
added an additional amount to account for exponential effects. 
Nonetheless, it could also be that many people are following a logic 
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that is totally different; in particular, when it comes to the estimation 
of economic growth in the long run, which is (at least semantically) a 
different task than, for example, the estimation of the development of 
a financial investment.  
This argument is strengthened by the fact that an enormous variance 
was observed in the estimations in Studies 1 to 3. The application of 
one common solution method, such as using a linear function and 
adding an additional amount to account for exponential effects, 
should not result in such a huge variance. This could also indicate 
that very different solution methods are used when participants judge 
economic growth in the long run.   
Therefore, this manuscript extends previous research with Study 4 by 
using the so-called “thinking-aloud method” to gain insight into the 
mental processes underlying the solution of the estimation task 
dealing with economic growth. This procedure aims to discover what 
actually happens in the minds of the participants during the 
calculations. With this procedure, the aim was to identify the real 
sources of error leading to the underestimations.  
Furthermore, it was aimed to identify the reasons underlying the 
worse estimations by the female participants in Studies 2 and 3. A 
subsequent question of interest was if female participants would tend 
to use more inadequate solution strategies than male participants. 
2.5.1.  Method 
2.5.1.1. Participants 
Similar to the procedure in Studies 2 and 3, estimations beyond a 
range of three standard deviations were excluded. Therefore, two 
participants were removed from the analysis to control for outliers. 
Finally, 99 participants (51 females, 48 males) found their way into 
the analysis. Thereof, 36 participants studied economics and 
business administration and, therefore, served as experts, whereas 
the remaining 63 participants served as laypeople. The gender 
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distribution was equal for both groups of participants. The 
participants were randomly recruited and anonymity was guaranteed. 
2.5.1.2. Procedure 
The participants were recruited on the campus and asked for their 
courses of studies. Since the methodology used in this study is 
sensitive toward expectations and the activation of certain decision 
routines, the participants were not informed about the topic to avoid 
unintended effects. If they agreed, they were led into single-
workrooms at the library of the University of Cologne. These rooms 
provided a silent environment to avoid disturbances and distractions 
during the interviews. Furthermore, a proper recording of the 
interviews was ensured. Then, the participants were introduced to 
the thinking-aloud method (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) and informed 
that they should describe what they are thinking by talking aloud. 
This should be done without thinking about how to verbalize certain 
ideas. In doing so, the participants should try to speak as 
continuously as possible.  
Following this introduction into the thinking-aloud method, the 
participants were informed that they were going to solve a task and 
that their particular solution method was the main interest of this 
study. Then, they were told that they were not allowed to use devices 
such as calculators or to do calculations in written form. 
Furthermore, they were advised to name an estimated value, even in 
case of uncertainty. They were informed that the interviews were 
recorded with a tape-recorder. Then, they were asked in writing, 
“What is the overall rise in national income within the next 25 years if 
the economy rises with an annual rate of 5%?” When answering this 
question, there was no time limit. In general, there were no 
comments from the interviewer during the answering, with the 
exception of explicit advice to think aloud during longer breaks. In 
some cases, this was necessary due to the unfamiliar situation of 
thinking aloud. After the interviews, the participants were thanked 
31 
and, by request, they were informed about the true result of the 
estimation task. 
Subsequently, the interviews were transcribed. A transcription 
technique developed by Kallmeyer and Schütze (1976) was used, 
which not only considers the wordings but also phonetical 
information such as noticeable accentuation, drawling, and the 
insertion of breaks. The transcripts were, subsequently, analyzed 
with methods of qualitative content analysis (Krippendorf, 1980; 
Mayring, 2003; Weber, 1990). This method allows for the systematical 
analysis and examination of material that is based on any form of 
communication.  
At the end of an iterative process, which required three repetitions, 
the material could satisfactorily be assigned to seven different 
categories, which are presented and discussed in the results section. 
2.5.2. Results and discussion 
As in the previous studies, the true value of 238.64% was clearly 
underestimated, which is demonstrated in a mean estimation of 
117.25% (SD = 113.76) for the entire sample, with estimations 
ranging from 2% to 600%. A closer look at the distribution of 
estimations revealed that the true value was underestimated by 
88.9% of the participants.  
However, the central task of this study was the identification of 
different approaches that are used when solving the task. Seven 
different approaches were identified, which can help explain how the 
underestimations arise. 
More than one-third of the participants (n = 35, 35.35%) used linear 
addition, simply multiplying the growth rate (5%) with the number of 
years (25). The effect of exponentiality was completely ignored, 
resulting in a mean estimation of 127.86% (SD = 30.78), which does 
not exactly equal the product of 5 and 25 because some participants 
did not calculate this product correctly. 
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The second largest group (n = 24, 24.24%) used linear addition and 
added an additional amount to account for exponential effects. Not 
surprisingly, this group provided better estimations than the group 
previously discussed, which is found in a mean estimation of 
212.92% (SD = 146.65). This estimation was remarkably close to the 
true value of 238.64%. 
The third largest group (n = 14, 14.14%) used an anchor value from 
the estimation task; that is, these participants either used the value 
“5” or “25”. Not too surprisingly, this procedure resulted in a poor 
mean estimation of 10.36% (SD = 8.87). 
This group was followed by participants (n = 11, 11.11%) who had no 
clue about how to answer the question and, therefore, guessed 
arbitrarily. These participants provided modest, albeit better, mean-
estimated values than the group previously discussed of 51.73% (SD 
= 72.67). 
Furthermore, seven participants were found who were basically on 
the right track and used a technique that we called “method of 
addition”, which can be described according to the following formula 
(with B0 as initial value and p as the percentage of the annual growth 
rate): 
{ [ B0 + B0 * ( 1 + p ) ] + [ B0 +  B0 * ( 1 + p ) ] * ( 1 + p )] +…}  (2) 
These participants were aware that the simple linear addition was not 
appropriate because exponential effects are ignored. They added 5% 
to the initial value and then added 5% to this value and so on. 
Unfortunately, this group did not use the appropriate initial value 
(100), but various, arbitrarily chosen, initial values lower than 100, 
which finally resulted in a modest mean estimation of 46.14% (SD = 
40.40). It appears remarkable that this group clearly underestimated 
the true value of 238.64% even though the participants of this group 
were aware that the simple linear addition (and, therefore, an 
estimation of 125%) was not appropriate because exponential effects 
were not considered. The underlying reasons for this result are 
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twofold. First, the participants used incorrect initial values. Second, 
it was impossible to keep up this calculation method over 25 periods. 
Hence, these participants could perform only partial computations 
over a few periods and extrapolate the end value. Unfortunately, this 
extrapolation was already based on the wrong partial computation. 
Evidence for the impact of partial computations on performance 
differences was also provided by Tversky and Kahneman (1973), who 
demonstrated that the product of a series of descending numbers 
(such as 8 * 7 * 6…1) was estimated more correctly than the product 
of a number of ascending numbers (such as 1 * 2 * 3…8). This effect 
was explained by the participants’ performing only partial 
computations. Because the results of the first few steps of 
multiplication (performed from left to right) are larger in the 
descending sequence than in the ascending sequence, the former 
expression was judged larger than the latter. The same explanation 
can be applied to the participants using the method of addition. 
Because these participants used incorrect and low initial values, the 
first steps of multiplication indicated to the participants that they 
were not dealing with a number as large as 238.64%.  
Yet another smaller group of 6 participants (6.06%) used a part of the 
correct formula: 
( 1 + 0.05 )25          (3) 
Very similar to the participants previously described, these 
participants completely lost sight of appropriate estimations when 
solving this formula, which finally resulted in a clear 
underestimation, as the mean estimation of 97.67% (SD = 197.75) 
demonstrates. Finally, two participants used the correct formula, 
resulting in a comparatively accurate estimation of 200%. 
In a subsequent ANOVA including the variables expertise and gender 
to predict the dependent variable estimations, the result from Study 3 
concerning gender was replicated, but no significant effect of the 
variable expertise was observed. While males’ estimates reached an 
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average of 144.54% (SD = 129.69), females’ average estimates reached 
a value of only 91.57% (SD = 90.37), F(1, 95) = 5.58, p < .05, η² = .06. 
In a next step, similar to the procedure in Studies 2 and 3, the 
validity of the estimations was also considered. Fifteen participants 
(15.2%) were assigned to the first category of valid estimations, which 
included more or less accurate estimations, lying within a range of 
50% less and 50% more than the true value of 238.64%. The 
remaining 84 participants (84.8%) were assigned to a second category 
of nonvalid estimations, including more or less inaccurate 
estimations. Table 3 summarizes the results from a binary logistical 
regression analysis, including the independent variables gender and 
expertise to predict the dependent variable valid estimations. 
Significant logit coefficients were observed for both expertise (b =.75, 
p < .05) and gender (b = –.66, p < .05), thus indicating that experts 
had a 2.11-fold higher chance of providing valid estimations, whereas 
females had a 0.52-fold lower chance of providing valid estimations. 
Table 3: Summary of Binary Logistic Regression Analysis. Regression 
Coefficients for Expertise and Gender Predicting Valid Estimations 
 
Variables b 
 
SE b 
 
Wald 
 
OR 
 
OR 95% CI 
Expertise        .75** 
 
.30 
 
6.33 
 
2.11 
 
(1.18 – 3.77) 
Gender      –.66** .33 4.02 0.52  (0.27 – 0.98) 
Constant   –2.05*** .36     32.38 0.13  
 
Note. OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval 
Nagelkerkes R² = .19. -2 log likelihood = 72.90. Correctly classified = 84.8%. 
The dependent variable Valid Estimations was coded with 0 = Nonvalid Estimations and 1 = Valid 
Estimations. The independent variable Expertise was coded with 0 = Laypeople and 1 = Experts. The 
independent variable Gender was coded with 0 = Male and 1 = Female.  
*p < .10, **p < .05, *** p < .01 
In sum, it was found that the gender effect could be completely 
replicated in Study 4. It was further found, in the section above, that 
the participants used very different solution strategies. It could be 
that the nonvalid estimations by female participants resulted from 
the application of inadequate solution strategies. In this case, the 
relation between gender and validity of the estimations should be 
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mediated by the application of more or less adequate solution 
methods. 
Upon a closer look at the methodology used in the seven solution 
methods discussed above, it appears that two solution methods could 
be considered adequate. First, using the linear addition and adding 
an additional amount to account for exponential effects seemed a 
comparatively promising solution method since it was based on the 
correct idea and facilitated a mental arithmetic that could contribute 
to fairly good estimations. Second, using the correct formula 
naturally appeared to be a promising solution method, even though 
this method was used by only two participants. For this reason, these 
two solution methods were considered to be adequate methods for the 
analyses to follow, whereas the remaining five solution methods were 
considered inadequate methods since these methods were 
conceptually wrong. 
To account for the particularities associated with the application of a 
dichotomous mediator, a standardization procedure suggested by 
Kenny (2008) was used. To test whether the application of 
adequate/inadequate solution methods is a mediating variable of the 
relationship between gender and valid estimations, three conditions 
must be fulfilled, according to Baron and Kenny (1986): (1) the 
independent variable must influence the mediator; (2) the mediator 
must influence the dependent variable; and (3) the influence of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable must be 
substantially lower when the influence of the mediator is controlled. 
Therefore, a series of regression analyses was conducted. It was 
found that the gender effect was, in fact, mediated by the application 
of adequate/inadequate solution methods. 
First, the influence of the independent variable gender on the 
mediator (adequate/inadequate solution methods) was significant, b 
= – 0.18, |t(99)| = 2.03, p < .05. The second equation, regressing the 
mediator adequate/inadequate solution methods on the dependent 
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variable valid estimations, was significant, b = 0.40, |t(99)| = 5.58, p 
< .01. In the final step, whether statistical control of 
adequate/inadequate solution methods reduced the influence of 
gender towards valid estimations was examined. Whereas the logit 
coefficient for gender was b = – 0.15, |t(99)| = 2.12, p < .05 without 
the mediator, if the variable adequate/inadequate solution methods 
was controlled for, the logit coefficient was no longer significant (b = – 
0.08, |t(99)| = 1.25, p > .21). It is, therefore, concluded that the 
relation between gender and valid estimations is partially mediated 
by the application of adequate or inadequate solution methods. 
In sum, the findings indicate that the explanations from previous 
research (Benzion et al., 2004; Keren, 1984; Wagenaar & Sagaria, 
1975) – underestimation of the exponent of the exponential function, 
using linear addition and adding an additional amount to account for 
exponential effects – can be applied to some of the participants in this 
study, in particular, the group using linear addition and adding an 
additional amount to account for the exponential effects. However, 
the results from this study show that many participants use 
calculation methods that go beyond these explanations (such as a 
simple linear addition) completely ignoring exponential effects or 
using anchor values from the estimation task. Another interesting 
finding was that half-knowledge of the correct formula could also 
account for the underestimations observed in Studies 1 to 3. For this 
reason, this study could, in fact, identify further sources of error, 
which may account for underestimations when people estimate 
economic growth in the long run. 
2.6. General Discussion 
In a series of four experiments, the extent to which people are able to 
understand and estimate the dynamics behind economic growth and 
what influences the accuracy of their estimations was examined. It 
was found that most participants were dramatically off the mark. 
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Only around 10% to 15% of the participants provided estimations 
within a range of 50% less and 50% more than the true value of 
238.64%. It was further found that the majority of the false 
estimations were systematically below the true value of 238.64%, 
which was underestimated by 88.9% to 92.1% of the participants. 
Further, Study 2 showed that the setting of the estimation task was, 
likewise, suited to influence the quality of the estimations – at least 
for those participants who did not recognize that economic growth 
and the development of a financial investment follow the same logic. 
A central finding from Study 3 was that people with high expertise in 
judging exponential effects, indeed, provided higher estimations than 
people with low expertise. Nonetheless, even these “experts” became 
victims of the general tendency of underestimation. It was further 
found that participants high in need for cognition were less subject to 
underestimations than participants low in need for cognition. 
Furthermore, no influence of incentives on the accuracy of the 
estimations was observed. Finally, Study 4 identified further wrong or 
“strange” calculation methods, such as using anchor values from the 
estimation task or arbitrarily guessing, thereby going beyond the 
explanations found in previous research. 
Besides the fact that people, on the whole, tended to underestimate 
economic growth in the long run, various insights emerged regarding 
what influences the quality of these estimations. First, Study 1 
yielded the remarkable finding that no significant difference was 
observed between the estimations for the 3% and the 5% growth rate. 
A possible explanation is provided by Study 4. Given that a 
noteworthy amount of participants used arbitrary techniques (such 
as anchor values from the task or guessing), this result can also be 
explained with a general lack of knowledge about how to estimate 
economic growth in the long run appropriately. Nonetheless, it is a 
surprising finding that these results were obtained with a sample of 
advanced students in economics and business administration. 
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Second, Study 2 yielded the finding that the setting of the estimation 
task influenced the quality of the estimations, at least for those 
participants who did not recognize that economic growth and the 
development of a financial investment are based on the same logic of 
exponential growth. This finding could be explained with the fact that 
the financial investment setting was suited to activate experience-
based, intuitive knowledge and, therefore, lead to higher and better 
estimations. Hence, it could be shown that presenting exponential 
tasks in more familiar formats enhances the quality of performance 
(Van Dooren, De Bock, Janssens, & Verschaffel, 2007).  
Third, Study 3 showed that using incentives did not improve the 
quality of the estimations. This supports the conclusion drawn from 
Camerer and Hogarth (1999) that a narrow-minded focus on 
incentives alone is misguided. Therefore, it appears as though 
incentives may have the intended effects only if the outcome is not 
limited by cognitive abilities. It was further found that, on the whole, 
the experts provided better estimations than the laypeople; thus, 
stressing the importance of experience when dealing with exponential 
processes. This is in line with the finding from Keren (1983), who 
demonstrated that previous experiences with high inflation rates 
improved the prediction of exponential growth. Another interesting 
finding in the current study was the positive influence of the need for 
cognition on the accuracy of the estimations. This finding extends 
previous research by pointing out that certain personality 
dispositions may also explain why some people provide better 
estimations than others.  
Fourth, Studies 2 to 4 showed that female participants provided 
inferior estimations than male participants. This effect did not 
disappear when controlling for interest in politics and economics. 
Since this is an unexpected result, it is difficult to provide 
appropriate explanations. A similar result was also obtained in a 
study by Kemp (1987) dealing with perception of inflation. His 
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explanation is mainly based on the fact that female participants 
display a higher purchase frequency of convenience goods. According 
to the principle of interference (e. g., Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1955), 
the higher purchase frequency may contribute to a replacement of 
remembered prices with current prices and, therefore, account for 
worse estimations of past prices by female participants. However, this 
explanation cannot be transferred to the context of economic growth. 
Study 4 provided another explanation, indicating that female 
participants displayed a stronger tendency to use inappropriate 
solution strategies. Nonetheless, this unexpected gender effect 
requires further investigation. Possibly inspired by the findings from 
Study 4, the questions of if and why females have more difficulties 
when dealing with the fourth dimension time (Dörner, Kimber, & 
Kimber, 1997) and exponential effects could be examined in further 
research.  
Finally, Study 4 found that, at least within the context of economic 
growth, the reasons for the underestimations go beyond the 
explanations from Wagenaar and Sagaria (1975) and Keren (1984), 
who identified an underestimation of the exponent. The same is true 
for the findings from Benzion et al. (2004), who concluded that their 
participants roughly used a linear function and added a too small 
amount to account for the exponential effects. It was found that the 
most chosen solution strategy was the linear addition completely 
ignoring exponential effects. This could be explained with a dominant 
linearity concept, which is even used in situations that require a non-
linear approach (Confrey & Smith, 1995; Van Dooren, De Bock, 
Hessels, Janssens, & Verschaffel, 2005). According to this 
interpretation, linear functions are used as a default in situations 
that require a non-linear approach as long as it is not clear which 
approach needs to be applied to a particular situation. Other 
participants used the wrong formula or arbitrary and inappropriate 
solution strategies. Therefore, it appears that many people have 
difficulties transferring their knowledge on exponential effects (if such 
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knowledge exists) to the context of economic growth. What are the 
practical implications of this study? 
First, the findings have implications for the economic education of 
the general public. It appears as though people, in general, have 
enormous difficulties when dealing with exponential growth rates. 
Nonetheless, it has been shown that this ability can be improved by 
learning (e. g., Dörner et al., 1997; Eisenstein & Hoch, 2005). In line 
with this consideration, it seems an encouraging finding that even 7-
year-olds seem to have a preliminary understanding of exponential 
processes (Ebersbach, Lehner, Resing, & Wilkening, 2008). Hence, 
findings from developmental psychology indicate an early intuitive 
knowledge about the characteristics of non-linear growth-rates long 
before non-linear functions are communicated at school (Ebersbach 
& Wilkening, 2007). Therefore, it appears that, to some extent, the 
ability to deal with exponentiality is inherent and, therefore, needs 
only to be developed. Another education-political implication is the 
importance of making people more familiar with situations in which 
the logic behind exponential effects applies. It cannot be excluded 
that a noticeable number of participants in our studies simply did not 
recognize that economic growth follows the logic of exponential 
effects. This stresses the importance of enabling people to transfer 
their knowledge on exponential effects to a variety of contexts where 
these effects apply. 
Second, the findings have implications for economic policies. Given 
that many people tend to extremely underestimate economic growth 
in the long run, it is just corollary that they have no idea about the 
economic impact of different growth rates over longer periods. 
Therefore, the fact that many people may not understand the 
importance of economic growth in the long run may, in turn, make it 
extremely difficult to implement economic and social reforms aimed 
to stimulate the economy. Therefore, this phenomenon deprives 
political communication of an important and convincing argument. 
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Considering that people appear to do better when judging non-linear 
processes if they are confronted with the corresponding processes in 
more familiar formats (Van Dooren et al., 2007), it could be a 
promising measure to present growth rates in less abstract forms 
than percentages and to stress analogies to other exponential 
processes with which people are more familiar. 
Another implication for economic policy is found when looking at the 
social security systems, in particular, the introduction of a funding 
principle. The idea of a funding principle is that an employee 
regularly pays certain amounts that are invested in the capital 
market. When this employee has retired, the accumulated capital is 
used to finance the pension. Contrary to a pay-as-you-go system, the 
funding principle is not vulnerable to changes in the age structure of 
a population. The funding principle is based on financial investments 
for each employee, but various studies (Benzion et al., 1992; 
Eisenstein & Hoch, 2005) show that people tend to underestimate the 
compounding and cumulative growth of financial investments. Now, if 
people tend to underestimate their accumulated capital in the future, 
it becomes likely that they underestimate their future pensions. This, 
in turn, could lead to reluctance against changes in the social 
security systems, even though they may be necessary to adapt the 
systems to changes in the age structure. 
Third, the findings have implications for the entire society and can be 
applied to overpopulation (Bartlett, Fuller, Plano Clark, & Rogers, 
2004), pollution (Wagenaar & Sagaria, 1975), or the diffusion of 
epidemics (Dörner et al., 1997). Another field of application is 
finance, in which the false estimation of growth may lead to unwished 
share prices (Harvey, Bolger, & McClelland, 1994). 
Finally, according to our findings, it appears as though the physician 
Albert A. Bartlett is correct when he concludes: “The greatest 
shortcoming of the human race is our inability to understand the 
exponential function” (2002). Nonetheless, some people understand 
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more than they appear to understand, as shown in the following 
quotation from one participant in Study 4, who provided a fairly good 
estimation in spite of an unconventional solution method: “…now if 
the compound interest calculation is suspended…ehm..let me think 
about it…we are paying off our apartment and there is..if there 2% 
ehm…then there are 5%....I think these are around 200%.“ 
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3. “I only believe in statistics that I faked 
myself” – How laypeople react when their 
beliefs on the economy are contradicted by 
experts  
3.1. Introduction 
For laypeople, economic issues are extremely complex and obscure. 
Nonetheless, the person in the street is continuously exposed to 
questions pertaining to economic issues and consequences, such as 
“Will I still have a job in 3 years?”, “Should I invest in stocks or 
property?” or “Which political party should I vote for?” Lay beliefs on 
the economy help laypeople to find their way in a complex and 
obscure economic world (Lewis & Furnham, 1986). These beliefs 
provide support, when it comes to economic decision making and the 
expression of opinion (a comprehensive overview on different lay 
beliefs is found in Furnham, 1988). The downside of lay beliefs is, 
however, that these may never be challenged and may therefore 
continue to exist, despite the fact that their validity is sometimes 
more than questionable. Hence, it should be a shocking experience 
for most laypeople, when their beliefs are contradicted by experts.  
This study aims to examine the reactions of economic laypeople, 
when their beliefs are contradicted by an economic expert. To this 
end, a German sample of replies to a newspaper article was subjected 
to content analysis. The newspaper article contradicted the 
widespread belief that the introduction of the euro was inflationary 
and provided comprehensive statistical evidence from the German 
Federal Statistical Office. Content analyses of the replies assessed the 
extent to which people still believed that the introduction of the euro 
was inflationary after having read the article. Furthermore, the 
nature of their reactions was evaluated. Using this non-reactive 
approach, we aimed to contribute to a triangulation of research 
addressing lay beliefs on the economy. Given that corresponding 
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research has thus far predominantly concentrated on reactive 
methods such as experiments or surveys (e. g., Kemp & Burt, 2001; 
Leiser & Drori, 2005; Boeri, Börsch-Supan, & Tabellini, 2001; 
Fetchenhauer & Haferkamp, in press), a non-reactive approach 
appeared to be worthwhile. It is assumed that the procedure adopted 
may provide insights into lay theories which extend beyond the scope 
of those provided by reactive methods including experiments and 
questionnaires. Previous studies have, for example, shown that 
insights into lay theories gained from individuals’ free discourse differ 
considerably from those obtained from questionnaires. In a study by 
Williamson and Wearing (1996), the cognitive models of economic 
laypeople based on open-ended questions revealed that laypeople 
appeared to understand the connection between government revenue 
and expenditure, whereas questionnaire responses suggested 
otherwise. We argue that the free discourse of individuals, as found 
in voluntary replies to a newspaper article rather than induced by 
questions, may contribute to a more complete understanding of the 
nature of lay beliefs on the economy.  
With regard to the methodological limitations of this procedure, 
Furnham (1986) has argued that using letters to the editor as data 
for an investigation of lay beliefs or theories is problematic for a 
number of reasons. He first brings forward the argument that 
newspaper readership is highly specific in terms of age, class, and 
geographic area. In order to secure total anonymity of the authors of 
the replies to the newspaper article in the present study, socio-
demographic data were not requested in any form. No information on 
the authors was therefore available. However, in order to mitigate 
Furnham’s objection, newspaper readership data were analyzed 
(Koelner-Stadtanzeiger, 2007). Readership was found to exhibit a 
structure very similar to that of the population in the area of 
circulation. It must nonetheless be conceded that only highly involved 
readers with the urge to express their opinion are likely to reply to a 
newspaper article. Furnham’s second point of criticism concerns the 
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pre-selection of letters; not all letters submitted to a newspaper are 
printed. In the present study, no such pre-selection on the part of the 
newspaper (e. g., the sorting out of very “poor” replies) took place, so 
that all replies to the article were included in our analysis.  
Why use the introduction of the euro as a means of investigating the 
persistence of lay beliefs? The “inflation” topic is currently 
experiencing a renaissance, as can be seen in comprehensive news 
coverage (e. g. Fischer, Brück, Wildhagen, Busch, Henry, Kamp, & 
Sprothen, 2007). This current popularity is mainly based on the fear 
of global inflation. This renaissance is also reflected in a considerable 
amount of current research which addresses perceived inflation and 
predominantly shows it to be constantly higher than the official 
inflation rate (e. g. Brachinger, in press; Traut-Mattausch et al., 
2004; Christandl & Fetchenhauer, in preparation-a).  
In summary, two different theoretical approaches can be discerned 
which could explain why so many people believe the introduction of 
the euro to have been inflationary. The first explanation is based on 
the confirmation bias (e. g. Traut-Mattausch, Schulz-Hardt, 
Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2004). Accordingly, numerous articles and 
reports lead to the generation of inflation expectations before the 
introduction of the euro, which were subsequently confirmed by the 
seeking or interpreting of evidence (e. g., biased perception of price 
increases) in such a way as to confirm these expectations. A second 
explanation is based on the framework of Prospect Theory 
(Brachinger, in press), according to which price increases for 
particular products are coded as losses and therefore subjectively 
overestimated.  
However, the current study did not aim to address the question as to 
how perceived inflation comes about and why so many people believe 
the introduction of the euro to have been inflationary. We rather 
aimed to extend previous research by examining why this belief 
remains stable even in the light of contradictory evidence from official 
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institutions such as the German Federal Statistical Office. The Theory 
of Lay Epistemics (Kruglanski, 1989, 1990) provides a useful 
theoretical framework which explains why closure on a certain topic – 
i. e., subjectively definite knowledge – proves helpful to lay people, 
when economic issues are concerned. The term closure refers to “a 
firm answer to a question” (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996, p. 264); a 
question which can stem from any thinkable area of human life. 
Closure can thus be achieved with respect to all possible questions 
(e.g. “What will the weather be like tomorrow?”) by arriving at 
subjectively definite answers. Lay beliefs on the economy help provide 
answers to and thus closure on economic questions. These answers 
are adaptive for a variety of reasons. First, they provide support when 
it comes to economic decision making. Second, they aid the 
expression of opinion in discussions on economic and political issues. 
Third, they protect (at least some) individuals from unpleasant 
information processing with respect to complex economic issues. 
Against the backdrop of these functional advantages, it can be 
assumed that many people have a strong desire for subjectively 
definite knowledge on economic topics. This in turn should 
contribute to a strong need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1998).  
The fact that many people report being extremely confident in their 
perception of significant accompanying price increases in 
consequence of the euro introduction indicates the presence of a 
widespread lay belief. This confidence was reflected in cross national 
studies of the European Commission at the beginning of 2002 
(European-Commission, 2002) and at the end of 2003 (European-
Commission, 2003). According to these studies, a large majority of 
people in all countries in the euro zone were certain that prices had 
tendentially been converted to the detriment of the consumer upon 
introduction of the euro. In 2003, this tendency became even 
stronger. What follows the formation of such beliefs? 
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When an individual possesses definitive knowledge on a certain topic 
– in the case of this study knowledge on the economy –, a strong need 
for closure prompts a freezing of this closure. The term freezing 
describes the preservation of past knowledge (Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996) and entails the maintaining of knowledge or beliefs impervious 
to subsequent, potentially relevant information. If, for example, a 
person has frozen upon the belief that “The sun is going to shine 
tomorrow”, it is highly likely that this belief will be maintained, even 
in the light of contradictory evidence, e. g. an unpleasant weather 
forecast. In the present study, economic laypeople were confronted 
with a newspaper article containing evidence that contradicted the 
widespread belief that the introduction of the euro was inflationary. 
Therefore, those who were convinced that the introduction of the euro 
lead to significant price increases were expected to display a strong 
freezing-tendency due to a high need for closure. Freezing of the lay 
belief (preservation of the belief that the introduction of the euro was 
inflationary) should lead people who have read the article to stick to 
their previous judgment. Perceived inflation, as reflected in reader 
replies to the article, would in this case remain high. Consequences 
of the freezing-tendency under a heightened need for closure have 
been examined in a large number of studies (comprehensive 
overviews are found in Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1998). Based on these studies and further theoretical 
considerations, five different reactions – each resulting from freezing 
due to a high need for cognitive closure – were expected. The 
magnitude of these reactions was expected to determine the extent to 
which individuals still believed the introduction of the euro to have 
been inflationary after having read the article. 
The first possible reaction is one-sided enumeration of examples. In 
this case, people contradict the expert-information by recounting and 
expressing examples of inflationary experiences. The fact that a low 
inflation rate does not necessarily imply constant prices for all 
products is ignored. On the contrary – particular inflationary 
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experiences are generalized to all products. The one-sided 
enumeration of examples appears to be similar to the preference of 
prototypical over diagnostic information. This preference was 
examined in a study (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1988) that required 
participants to judge whether or not a target person belonged to a 
given professional category. Results indicated that subjects with a 
heightened need for closure were more likely to seek prototypical 
information (information exclusively regarding prototypical features of 
the professional category), whereas subjects avoiding cognitive 
closure were more likely to request diagnostic information (Trope & 
Bassok, 1983), that is information regarding typical and non-typical 
features of the professional category. A positive hypothesis testing 
strategy such as that adopted by those subjects with a strong need 
for closure is also performed when people single out isolated 
inflationary experiences in order to confirm the hypothesis that the 
introduction of the euro was inflationary. At the same time, non-
inflationary occurrences – which objectively exist – are neglected. 
Based on these considerations, it is expected that the greater 
subjects’ tendency to use a one-sided enumeration of examples in 
their replies to the newspaper article, the stronger the perceived 
inflation reflected in these replies should be.  
The second possible reaction is one-sided argumentation. The 
rationale behind this reaction is also based on the positive hypothesis 
testing strategy discussed above. Compared to the enumeration of 
examples, however, the generation of arguments such as “lots of 
insolvencies in the retail trade indicate that excessive price increases 
were realized” requires a higher level of prior knowledge on the topic 
in question. Given such higher levels of prior knowledge, a high need 
for closure should lead to a biased memory search (Kruglanski, 
Webster, & Klem, 1993), which enhances the rejection of the message 
in the newspaper article by retrieving one-sided arguments from 
memory. With regard to the freezing tendency, it is expected that the 
greater subjects’ tendency to use a one-sided argumentation in their 
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replies to the newspaper article, the stronger the perceived inflation 
reflected in these replies should be. 
The third possible reaction is self-centeredness. Self-centered 
subjects focus on the self, which is reflected in the way that they 
argue. They are closed-minded to the perspectives of others and there 
is no abstraction from their own perspective. A theoretical 
explanation for this phenomenon is that due to a strong need for 
closure and subsequent freezing, the individual’s mental efforts are 
reduced when new information is processed. Experimental studies 
have shown that under a heightened need for closure, the freezing 
tendency leads to a predominant self-focus (Kruglanski et al., 1993) 
and a reduction in perspective taking and empathic concern 
(Webster, Findley, & Irvin, 1995). Based on these theoretical 
considerations and empirical findings, it is expected that the greater 
subjects’ tendency to adopt a self-centered argumentation in their 
replies to the newspaper article, the stronger the perceived inflation 
reflected in these replies should be. 
The fourth possible reaction is emotionality. People reacting with high 
emotionality display displeasure and anger. If a person believes that 
the introduction of the euro was inflationary, confrontation and 
processing of expert information arguing the converse leads to 
cognitive inconsistency. According to dissonance-theoretical 
considerations (Festinger, 1957), emotionality should be stronger, the 
more people have already invested in their belief that the introduction 
of the euro was inflationary. According to Kruglanski (1989), logical 
inconsistencies can undermine one’s confidence in a knowledge 
structure. If a certain knowledge structure or belief is frozen upon 
due to a strong need for cognitive closure, its undermining through 
inconsistent information should induce negative affect. Based on 
these theoretical considerations, it is expected that the higher the 
emotionality displayed in the replies to the newspaper article, the 
stronger the perceived inflation reflected in these replies should be. 
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The fifth possible reaction is the discrediting of the communicator of 
the counter persuasive message, the German Federal Statistical 
Office. Group experiments investigating the freezing tendency due to 
a strong need for cognitive closure have found that persons 
displaying a deviant opinion are devaluated, when a high need for 
closure is induced (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991). The very same 
devaluating reaction might arise in response to the communicator of 
the counter persuasive message in the present study. Such 
devaluation may also be realized by discrediting the message of the 
communicator instead of the communicator him/herself. In this 
study, this would entail the discrediting of statistical information or 
statistics in general. Based on these theoretical considerations, it is 
expected that the greater subjects’ tendency to discredit statistics or 
the German Federal Statistical Office in the replies to the newspaper 
article, the stronger the perceived inflation reflected in these replies 
should be.  
Interactions between these reactions pose a subsequent question of 
interest. The framework provided by the Theory of Lay Epistemics 
first of all suggests that all these different reactions are a 
consequence of the freezing tendency which arises from a strong need 
for closure. Hence, these reactions should appear simultaneously and 
be positively correlated. Nonetheless, a more differentiated view of 
these different reactions could also suggest inter-individual 
differences. For instance, it appears plausible that differential replies 
can be expected from individuals with comparatively sophisticated 
knowledge on the inflation topic and those with only modest 
knowledge. Accordingly, an individual with sophisticated knowledge 
might tend to offer arguments which contradict the article, whereas 
the individual with modest knowledge will find another way to react, 
such as, for example, by generating counter-examples which may in 
turn be guided by high self-centeredness. 
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In order to examine laypeople’s reactions when their beliefs are 
contradicted by an economic expert, a total of 156 replies were 
subjected to content analysis. 
3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Sample 
In a first step, all replies to the newspaper article were collected. 
These replies consisted of either letters that had been sent to the 
newspaper or comments in a web forum. The authors of the letters 
were garbled by the editor in order to assure total anonymity. The 
sample comprised a total of 103 letters and 53 comments in the web 
forum. A comparison of the two reply types revealed no significant 
differences, with the exception self-centeredness, which was slightly 
higher in the letters. The two types of reply were otherwise very 
similar and were thus treated as a single sample. 
3.2.2. Stimulus 
In the present study, reactions to a newspaper article that appeared 
in a respectable urban German newspaper (Koelner Stadtanzeiger) 
were subject to content analysis. The article addressed the question 
as to whether the introduction of the euro was inflationary and 
argued predominantly against a general price increase, conceding 
only a few inflationary experiences mentioned by customers. In 
contrast, extensive reasoning and statistical evidence from the 
German Federal Statistical Office was provided, which indicated that 
the introduction of the euro was not inflationary. The article appeared 
during the second half of 2004, more than 2.5 years after the 
introduction of the euro. 
3.2.3. Procedure 
All variables were derived from theoretical considerations regarding 
the freezing tendency due to a strong need for closure. These 
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considerations yielded the variables Two-sided Examples, Two-sided 
Arguments, Self-centeredness, Emotionality and Discrediting. The 
variable Perceived Inflation was introduced as a measure of whether 
participants’ replies generally reflected the opinion that the 
introduction of the euro was inflationary after having read the article. 
For the measurement of the variables Two-sided Examples, Two-sided 
Arguments, Discrediting and Perceived Inflation, two raters were 
used. These raters were extensively familiarized with the variables in 
a first step comprising informative literature with definitions and 
explanations. Examples of extreme values were provided in a second 
step. On the basis of these examples, the values of the variables as 
well as possible difficulties when rating the replies were extensively 
discussed. In a third step, ten comments were rated and the results 
discussed in depth. This procedure was designed to uncover 
discrepancies between the two raters and difficulties in 
understanding. Raters were then first required to rate the 156 replies 
for the variable Perceived Inflation. Two weeks later, they separately 
rated the 156 replies for the remaining variables by completing a 
questionnaire for each reply.  
The variable Perceived Inflation measured the extent to which a reply 
agreed or disagreed with the newspaper article. This variable was 
measured on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 = absolutely no price 
increase to 7 = a definite price increase. When rating this variable, 
raters were advised to read the whole reply before holistically 
evaluating the perceived inflation expressed by the author. Interrater 
reliability, which was measured as the correlation between the two 
raters, was rk = .96. An excerpt from a reply with a low perceived 
inflation value is “In contrast to the absolute majority in our country, 
I am convinced that there has been absolutely no price increase due 
to the introduction of the euro”, whereas a high value is reflected in 
an excerpt such as “I see the introduction of the euro as inflationary. 
What has been done to our money is absolute brazenness.” As can be 
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seen in Row 1 of Table 4 (Perceived Inflation), a large majority of the 
replies disagreed with the expert information provided by the German 
Federal Statistical Office (M = 6.06, SD = 1.79). This finding supports 
the assumption of a widespread belief that the introduction of the 
euro was inflationary. Nonetheless, 17.9% of the replies were of the 
opinion that the introduction of the euro was not inflationary, so that 
a more detailed comparison of the replies which agreed and disagreed 
with the newspaper article was possible. 
The variable Two-sided Examples measured the extent to which 
people tended to use or neglect a two-sided enumeration of examples. 
Examples of price increases and no price increases in the replies were 
thus measured first. To this end, raters counted the examples of 
products which had become more expensive and those which had not 
become more expensive due to the introduction of the euro. A new 
score was subsequently computed as a measure of peoples’ tendency 
to neglect a two-sided enumeration of examples. A reply was assigned 
the value “1”, given that at least one example of a price increase and 
one example of no price increase was mentioned. The value “1” thus 
denotes a two-sided enumeration of examples. Otherwise, the value 
“0” was assigned.  This denotes a one-sided enumeration of 
examples. In this way, the indicator variable Two-sided Examples was 
formed. A two-sided enumeration of examples was found in 26.28% of 
the replies. 
The variable Two-sided Arguments measured the extent to which 
people tended to use or neglect a two-sided argumentation. 
Arguments supporting and disputing a general price increase due to 
the introduction of the euro were rated first. In order to measure the 
arguments supporting a general price increase, raters were instructed 
to judge how many arguments a reply used to justify that the 
introduction of the euro had been inflationary. This measurement 
was based on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = absolutely no 
arguments supporting a price increase to 7 = many arguments 
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supporting a price increase. Interrater reliability was rk = .81. The 
following quote is an example of argumentation, which is supportive 
of a general price increase: “I think the retail trade is in trouble 
because of the price increases which occurred when the euro was 
introduced. Obviously, they tried to earn lots of money with the 
introduction of a new currency. This can be seen in unused 
industrial real estate as well as in numerous insolvencies. The low 
price increases for food may be explained by the fact that many 
merchants started to increase their prices back in the middle of 2001, 
so that a correct conversion at the beginning of 2002 was possible”.  
Raters also judged the arguments disputing a general price increase 
due to the introduction of the euro. A 7-point scale ranging from 1 = 
absolutely no arguments disputing a price increase to 7 = many 
arguments disputing a price increase was used. Interrater reliability 
of this variable was rk = .81. The following quote exemplifies a reply 
with a comparatively high number of arguments disputing a price 
increase: “When the euro was introduced, some “rotten apples” were 
certainly to be found. But they were in the minority. They have 
already been punished by the consumers. Furthermore, competition 
in Germany is so strong that huge price increases are doomed to 
failure. Moreover, mass media have contributed to this negative price 
image. There has hardly been any discrimination.” 
In line with the procedure adopted for the variable Two-sided 
Examples, a new score was also computed for Two-sided Arguments. 
Accordingly, a subject was assigned the value “1”, when at least one 
argument supporting and disputing a general price increase was 
mentioned. Otherwise, the value “0” was assigned to denote one-sided 
argumentation. This procedure yielded the variable Two-sided 
Arguments. Only 7.05% of the replies used a Two-sided 
Argumentation, indicating that the classical structure of essay 
writing with a consideration of pros and cons scarcely occurred. 
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The variable Self-centeredness measured the egotism of the 
argumentation, i.e. the extent to which the perspective of others was 
ignored. In replies to a newspaper article, a strong self-centeredness 
could be discerned from a frequent use of words characterizing a 
preoccupation with one’s own perspective (I, my, we and our). 
Therefore, this variable was operationalized as the number of such 
self-reference words occurring in a reply. In order to ensure 
comparability between long and short replies, these words were 
subsequently divided by the total number of words in the reply. The 
resulting number thus reflected the proportion of words displaying 
egotism. The following statement is a typical highly self-centered 
reply: „This week my refrigerator broke down. I draw a small pension. 
I called the social welfare office and was informed that a small 
amount of 41 euros is available per month as basic financial help for 
such purchases. In the very same call, I was told that another 
payment has been reduced from 144 euros to 61 euros. I have severe 
problems with my back. How am I supposed to pay for help with 61 
euros?” As seen in column 1 for the variable Self-centeredness, 
3.36% of the words used in the replies were self-centered words such 
as “I” and “we”. 
The variable Emotionality measured displeasure and anger reflected 
in the writing style. Two different measurements for capturing this 
variable were considered. First, the raters judged the level of 
emotionality reflected in the writing style of the authors on 7-point 
scales. However, because it was at least questionable whether these 
ratings would appropriately capture the emotionality of the replies, a 
second measure was introduced. This measure was based on the 
notion that displeasure and anger should be reflected in an increased 
usage of exclamation marks. For this reason, the number of 
exclamation marks occurring in each reply to the newspaper article 
was counted. In line with the procedure adopted for the variable self-
centeredness, the number of exclamation marks was subsequently 
divided by the total number of words in a reply in order to ensure 
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comparability between long and short reactions to the newspaper 
article. A closer examination of the distribution of this score revealed 
that no exclamation marks were used in slightly less than 50 % of the 
replies. A small group of replies were characterized by a large number 
of exclamation marks. In order to account for such extreme values, 
replies were trichotomized. An examination of the distribution of the 
trichotomized variable Emotionality shows that 44.2% of the replies 
belonged to the lowest category (0 = no emotionality), 34.6% to the 
medium category (0.5 = medium emotionality) and 21.2% to the 
highest category (1.0 = high emotionality). This resulted in a mean 
value of 0.38 for this variable. Due to a correlation of rs = .51, p < .01 
of this measurement with the ratings, we decided to use the 
exclamation mark measure as a more objective measure of 
emotionality. The following statement represents a highly emotional 
writing style: “What a load of trash!! I don’t know where and how the 
statisticians conducted their survey, but it certainly can’t have been 
in Germany or even on this planet! To my mind, life has become 
bloody expensive since the introduction of this damned euro. These 
statisticians and politicians with their killer wages should simply buy 
food for a week and see what it costs!!!”  
The variable Discrediting measured several aspects of the replies. 
First, it covered the general questioning of statistics, e. g. the claim 
that statistics are ambivalent, inaccurate etc. This aspect is reflected 
in a statement such as “anything can be proved with statistics”. 
Second, the variable covered the use of statements which critically 
targeted the basket of commodities used by the German Federal 
Statistical Office. Third, Discrediting also covered statements 
assuming sugar-coated numbers as well as manipulable and 
purchasable statisticians. Aspects two and three are reflected in the 
following statement: “Churchill said “I only believe in statistics that I 
faked myself”. That is why the basket of commodities compiled by the 
‘experts of the German Federal Statistical Office’ according to their 
own wishes, does not constitute proper measurement. In my 
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experience, these constructed statistics are wrong. They are nothing 
more than public palaver and take us for a fool”. The Discrediting of 
statistics or the German Federal Statistical Office occurred in 24.36% 
of the replies. For the rating of this variable, the raters identified 
whether statistics were discredited in the newspaper replies.  The 
value “0” was assigned, when no discrediting occurred and “1”, when 
discrediting occurred. Interrater reliability was rk = .98. 
In summary, 156 replies to a newspaper article were analyzed 
according to the categories Perceived Inflation, Two-sided Examples, 
Two-sided Arguments, Self-centeredness, Emotionality and 
Discrediting. The descriptive statistics for these variables are 
summarized in columns two and three of Table 4. 
Table 4: Means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients for the 
variables Perceived Inflation, Self-centeredness and Emotionality and 
percentages and correlation coefficients for the variables Two-sided Examples, 
Two-sided Arguments and Discrediting 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1. Perceived inflation 6.06a 
 
1.79 – –.22** 
       
–.29**     .16* 
    
.23** 
    
.28** 
 
2. Two-sided examples 
 
0.26b 
  
–   .14 –.07 –.11  .07 
 
3. Two-sided arguments 
 
0.07b 
   
– –.04 –.13 –.09 
 
4. Self-centeredness 
 
3.36c 
 
2.23 
   
–   .09 –.05 
 
5. Emotionality 
 
0.38d 
 
0.39 
    
–   .05 
 
6. Discrediting  
 
0.24b 
 
 
     
– 
 
Note. aThe variable Perceived Inflation was measured on a 7-point scale (1 = absolutely no price increase, 7 = a 
definite price increase). bSince Two-sided Examples, Two-sided Arguments and Discrediting are dichotomous 
variables, values represent the fraction of replies in which the enumeration of two-sided examples, two-sided 
arguments or discrediting of statistics occurred. cValues of the continuous variable Self-centeredness represent the 
mean percentage (in %) of self-centered words. dValues of the discontinuous variable Emotionality range from 0 
= no emotionality to 1 = high emotionality. 
*p < .05. **p < .01 
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3.3. Results 
In a first step, bivariate correlations were considered. Correlations 
between the continuous variables Perceived Inflation, Self-
centeredness and the discontinuous variable Emotionality were 
computed using Spearman rank correlation coefficients. Correlations 
between the continuous or discontinuous variables Perceived 
Inflation, Self-centeredness, Emotionality and the dichotomous 
variables Two-sided Examples, Two-sided arguments and 
Discrediting were computed using biserial (rank-) correlations. Phi 
correlations were computed as a measure of association between 
dichotomous variables. A closer look at the correlations between the 
predictor variables Two-sided Examples, Two-sided Arguments, Self-
centeredness, Emotionality and Discrediting reveals none of them to 
have been significant. This suggests differential reactions of economic 
laypeople who are confronted with evidence contradicting their beliefs 
on the economy. 
Based on theoretical considerations surrounding the freezing 
tendency due to a strong need for closure, people’s conviction that 
the introduction of the euro was inflationary after reading the article 
was expected to be the stronger, the more the five reactions one-sided 
enumeration of examples, one-sided argumentation, self-
centeredness, emotionality and discrediting appeared. As seen in 
Table 5, a simultaneous regression analysis including the five 
reactions as predictors of Perceived Inflation reveals that this was 
indeed the case. Hence, a negative regression coefficient for Two-
sided Examples (β = –.18, p < .05) and Two-sided Arguments (β = –
.21, p < .01) was observed. These coefficients indicate that the lower 
the tendency of subjects to list examples and arguments in a 
balanced manner, the higher their Perceived Inflation after having 
read the article. In contrast, subjects who tended to consider 
evidence for both views by and large did not believe the introduction 
of the euro to have been inflationary. These findings confirm the 
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assumption that the freezing tendency due to a strong need for 
closure leads to a positive hypothesis testing strategy and in turn to a 
one-sided enumeration of examples and argumentation. A positive 
regression coefficient was observed for Self-centeredness (β = .16, p < 
.05). This confirms the assumption that self-centered argumentation 
is associated with high perceived inflation in reaction to the article. 
Additionally, as expected, the cognitive inconsistency triggered by 
undermining the belief that the introduction of the euro was 
inflationary, lead to emotional reactions, as seen in the positive 
coefficient for Emotionality (β = .16, p < .05). Finally, Discrediting of 
the communicator of the counter persuasive information – the 
German Federal Statistical Office – was also a significant predictor 
variable for Perceived Inflation (β = .27, p < .01). 
Table 5: Summary of Simultaneous Regression Analysis. Regression 
coefficients for Predictors of Perceived Inflation 
 
Variable β 
Two-sided examples           –.18* 
Two-sided arguments           –.21** 
Self-centeredness             .16* 
Emotionality             .16* 
Discrediting  .27** 
 
Note. R² = .24. F(5, 150) = 9.42, p < .01.   
*p < .05. **p < .01 
 
All hypotheses thus far were confirmed by simultaneous regression 
analysis. Nonetheless, the reasons for the comparatively weak 
correlations between the independent variables remain unclear. One 
possible explanation is that particular reactions are common to 
particular groups of people. This should be reflected in different 
clusters of replies, with homogeneous replies within a cluster and 
heterogeneous replies between clusters. Given that both continuous 
and dichotomous variables were used, a two-step cluster analysis 
based on log-likelihood distances was conducted using Two-sided 
Examples, Two-sided Arguments, Self-centeredness, Emotionality 
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and Discrediting as active variables. Despite the fact that the data did 
not completely comply with the requirements of a normal distribution 
for continuous variables and a multinomial distribution for 
categorical variables, this procedure appeared legitimate given that 
the algorithm is also assumed to function reasonably well when these 
assumptions are not met (Norušis, 2007). Applying the Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion, three clusters which substantially differed in 
their patterns of argumentation were identified. Results of the two-
step cluster analysis are presented in Table 6. A closer investigation 
of the differences between these clusters reveals that, with the 
exception of the variable self-centeredness, significant differences 
were observed. This is indicative of homogeneity within and 
heterogeneity between the different clusters and therefore of a 
satisfactory cluster solution. 
Table 6: Results of two-step-cluster analysis using Two-sided Examples, Two-
sided Arguments, Self-centeredness, Emotionality and Discrediting as active 
variables 
 1 2 3 
 
Simplifiers 
n = 84 
Conspiracy 
theorists 
n = 40 
Statisticians 
n = 32 
Two-sided examples 0.00a 0.33b 0.87c 
Two-sided arguments 0.00a 0.03a 0.28b 
Self-centeredness 3.57a 3.33a 2.83a 
Emotionality 0.41b 0.44b 0.25a 
Discrediting 0.00a 0.95b 0.00a 
 
Note. Values of the dichotomous variables Two-sided Examples, Two-sided Arguments and 
Discrediting represent the fraction of replies in a particular cluster which used two-sided examples, 
two-sided arguments or discrediting, respectively. Values of the continuous variable Self-centeredness 
represent the mean percentage (in %) of self-centered words used in a particular cluster. Values of the 
discontinuous variable Emotionality represent mean use of exclamation marks in a particular cluster, 
ranging from 0 = no emotionality to 1 = high emotionality. 
Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in LSD post hoc multiple 
comparisons for the continuous variable Self-centeredness and the discontinuous variable 
Emotionality. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 according to the χ2 
statistics for the dichotomous variables Two-sided Examples, Two-sided Arguments and Discrediting. 
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Cluster 1, the group of Simplifiers (53.85%, Column 2 of Table 6) 
displayed an unelaborate and comparatively emotional style of 
argumentation. This group completely ignored examples and 
arguments indicating that the introduction of the euro was not 
inflationary. This was seen in a complete lack of two-sided 
enumeration of examples and argumentation. No discrediting of 
statistics occurred in this group. To summarize, this large group 
adopted a very simple pattern of argumentation which consisted of 
the enumeration of a few inflationary experiences with particular 
products.  
Cluster 2, the group of Conspiracy Theorists (25.64%, Column 3 of 
Table 6) also predominantly neglected examples and arguments 
supporting the view point that the introduction of the euro was not 
inflationary. At the same time, this group strongly discredited 
statistics and the German Federal Statistical Office and therefore 
invested considerable effort in their counter-argumentation which 
was guided by comparatively high emotionality. 
Cluster 3, the group of Statisticians (20.51%, Column 4 of Table 6) 
displayed a balanced enumeration of examples. This was shown in 
the frequent enumeration of products with stable prices as well as of 
those for which price increases had been realized. Furthermore, 
compared to the Simplifiers and Conspiracy Theorists, this group 
tended to consider evidence for both views significantly more often, as 
seen in a comparatively high level of two-sided arguments.  Finally, 
the statisticians did not discredit statistics in any way and displayed 
low emotionality. 
The more differentiated comparison of different clusters of replies 
clarified that three different patterns of argumentation occurred. The 
large group of simplifiers displayed a highly superficial pattern, 
whereas the smaller groups of conspiracy theorists and statisticians 
invested considerable effort into their argumentation. The 
statisticians displayed greater openness with respect to the examples 
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and arguments cited in the newspaper article, whereas the simplifiers 
and conspiracy theorists argued against or ignored these examples 
and arguments and were guided by higher emotionality. Given these 
different patterns of argumentation, it is not surprising that the three 
clusters differed in Perceived Inflation, F(2, 153) = 19.93, p < .01, η² = 
.21. Indeed, Perceived Inflation was significantly lower for the 
statisticians (M = 4.55, SD = 2.11) than for both the simplifiers (M = 
6.19, SD = 1.79, p < .01) and the conspiracy theorists (M = 6.94, SD = 
0.20, p < .01). 
3.4. Discussion 
This study aimed to examine the reactions of economic laypeople 
when their beliefs were contradicted by an expert. A number of 
interesting results were yielded. First, a variety of reactions which 
can be considered typical for the “freezing” tendency due to a strong 
need for cognitive closure were observed. People preferred a one-sided 
enumeration of examples and counter-arguments, despite the 
objective existence and even presentation of several examples and 
arguments supporting the expert information in the newspaper 
article. People also tended to focus on the self and were closed-
minded to the perspective of others. Furthermore, their urge to 
maintain closure was guided by increased emotionality when their 
belief on the economy was attacked. Finally, the freezing tendency 
caused people to discredit the communicator of the counter 
persuasive evidence; in this study, the German Federal Statistical 
Office, which is a reputable and credible institution. The non-reactive 
approach adopted in this study therefore demonstrated the validity of 
the theory of lay epistemics beyond the realms of the laboratory, 
showing that it can indeed be applied to real-world phenomenon such 
as the introduction of the euro. 
Second, these reactions were found to occur independently of one 
another. Faced with counter persuasive evidence from the German 
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Federal Statistical Office, very different reactions contributed to high 
perceived inflation after having read the newspaper article. This was 
particularly evident when examining different clusters of replies. The 
simplifiers and conspiracy theorists – the two groups which both 
strongly disagreed with the newspaper article – displayed very 
different efforts and patterns of argumentation. One possible 
explanation for the differential reactions could be rooted in different 
levels of education. It would appear plausible that the 
oversimplification carried out by the simplifiers was largely due to 
nothing other than a lack of knowledge. This lack of knowledge 
prevented a more sophisticated level of argumentation.  
The fact that people neglect a two-sided enumeration of examples and 
arguments when they are convinced that the introduction of the euro 
was inflationary, affirms that individuals seek or interpret evidence in 
line with existing beliefs. This is known as the confirmation bias 
(Nickerson, 1998). However, the confirmation bias does not occur 
when people agree with the message of the newspaper article; these 
individuals tend to use a two-sided enumeration of examples and 
arguments. It would therefore appear that there are further 
preconditions for the occurrence of the confirmation bias; for 
example, freezing as a consequence of a heightened need for closure. 
The discrediting of statistics and the German Federal Statistical 
Office - a competent and trustworthy institution - is a further 
remarkable finding. This reaction could have been fostered by the fact 
that – at least some – economic laypeople have difficulty 
understanding what experts do and say, for instance the logic of 
measuring inflation rates with baskets of commodities. This difficulty 
of understanding is a phenomenon which has also been referred to as 
the curse of expertise (Hinds, 1999). The assumption that experts are 
often difficult to understand is corroborated by studies addressing lay 
knowledge on the economy in the context of governmental 
expenditure, inflation, old age insurance, and economic policies (e. g., 
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Simon Kemp & Burt, 2001; Leiser & Drori, 2005; Boeri, Börsch-
Supan, & Tabellini, 2001; Fetchenhauer & Haferkamp, in press), 
which suggest that laypeople are in general only moderately equipped 
with knowledge on the economy. Such difficulties in understanding 
may foster misinterpretation of serious and well-founded expert 
information. Here, parallels can be drawn with medical 
communication and the phenomenon that many patients do not even 
understand what disease they are suffering from. This lack of 
knowledge decreases compliance and increases the tendency to 
attribute a lack of cure to a lack of competence on the part of the 
attending physicians (Ley & Llewelyn, 1995). We will now turn to the 
practical implications of the results of the present study. 
 It was demonstrated that lay beliefs on the economy are highly 
resistant to active attempts of counter persuasion, regardless of the 
credibility of the communicator or the quality of the arguments used. 
These findings are important in the context of economic policies and 
the process of political persuasion. It would, for example, appear 
almost impossible to find consent for measures of economic and 
social reform which are not in line with existing economic beliefs. An 
economic expert who explains, for instance, that the cutback of coal 
subsidies leads to a decrease in unemployment (Fetchenhauer & 
Haferkamp, in press) is likely to be met with reactions similar to 
those observed in this study, i.e. characterized by one-sided examples 
(e.g. the “poor” coal miners) and arguments (which for example ignore 
the fact that the money could be used otherwise), self-centeredness, 
emotionality and the discrediting of the economic expert.  
In conclusion, the adeptness with which people are able to disprove 
the clear evidence and solid arguments of a highly credible institution 
in order to maintain their belief that the introduction of the euro was 
inflationary is most remarkable. Nonetheless, some people prove 
more creative than others. Here is a quote from the reader who was 
hit hardest: “To my mind, there has been a quadruplication of prices! 
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Before the introduction of the euro my pension was 1.000 DM and 
now it’s 500 euros, which is 50 % less. At the same time, a scoop of 
ice-cream has doubled in price from 0.80 DM to 0.80 Cents, which is 
the equal to 1.60 DM. According to my calculation, prices have 
therefore been increased four-fold!!!!!!!! Is there anyone able to prove 
that black is white?” 
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4. The biggest tax increase all-time! – An 
examination of the confirmation bias in a real-
world setting 
4.1. Introduction 
People tend to seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to 
existing beliefs, expectations or a certain hypothesis in hand. This 
phenomenon is called confirmation bias and has received 
comprehensive attention in various experimental situations and was 
found to be a stable and ubiquitous phenomenon (a comprehensive 
review on research dealing with the confirmation bias is found in 
Nickerson, 1998). Nonetheless, up to now its practical relevance in 
real-world settings has hardly been explored, despite it could be of 
immense importance in the area of political decision making and 
communication. If for example the impact of wrong beliefs on political 
measures such as tax increases or changes in the health care 
systems etc. is considered, a confirmation bias may lead to the 
exaggerated perception of negative consequences, which objectively 
might not exist. This in turn may be followed by public unhappiness 
and as the case may be consumer reticence, guided by setbacks in 
economic activity.  
This study used a value-added tax increase in Germany at the 
beginning of 2007 to address two questions. First, it was examined in 
how far a confirmation bias can be observed in consequence to a real-
world event such as a value-added tax increase. Second, it was 
examined if such a confirmation bias in a real-world setting is rather 
based on expectations, predominantly ignoring the factual price 
development, or if it is the result of a biased perception of confirming 
or diconfirming evidence, respectively. To answer these questions, 
this study used a panel design. 
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In a first survey two months before the value-added tax increase, the 
general price increase expectation was measured for 307 
participants. Besides they also had to judge the current prices and 
anticipated future prices for eight different products. In a second 
survey two months after the value-added tax increase, the same 307 
participants were asked again. They were asked to judge the current 
prices and the experienced price increases. Using this procedure we 
aimed at uncovering in how far the expectations from the first survey 
were confirmed or disconfirmed, respectively, after the value-added 
tax increase. Recent research dealing with the Euro introduction has 
already examined the confirmation of expectations in the light of 
disconfirming evidence (e. g. Greitemeyer, Schulz-Hardt, Traut-
Mattausch, & Frey, 2005; Traut-Mattausch et al., 2004). However, to 
the best of our knowledge this study is the first attempt measuring 
expectations before a real-world event occurred and afterwards 
examining, in how far these expectations were confirmed or 
disconfirmed, respectively.  
After Friday, 19 May 2006, when the Lower House of German 
Parliament decided the value-added tax rate to be increased from 
16% to 19%, the German media scene consistently reacted with a 
loud outcry. This was shown in newspaper headings such as “Lower 
House of German Parliament decides the biggest tax increase since 
1949” (Spiegel-Online, 2006) or “The biggest tax rip-off all-time” 
(Express-Online, 2006). On the whole, many signs indicated that a 
little while after the decision to increase the value-added tax rate a 
widespread and undifferentiated belief was established that the 
value-added tax increase would lead to noticeable price increases. On 
the contrary, the German Federal Statistical Office (DESTATIS) 
expected moderate price increases of maximum 1.4% (DESTATIS, 
2006).  
A closer look at research dealing with perceived inflation due to the 
Euro introduction in Germany (Brachinger, in press; Greitemeyer et 
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al., 2005; Traut-Mattausch et al., 2004) suggests that people clearly 
tended to overestimate the price trend following the Euro 
introduction. To a certain extent, parallels between the value-added 
tax increase and the Euro introduction can be drawn, because in 
both cases people expected noticeable price increases. Furthermore, 
the confirmation bias is likely to occur in situations that are 
inherently complex and ambiguous (Nickerson, 1998). Without doubt 
it can be said that the perception of price increases may indeed be 
characterized by high complexity and ambiguitiy, because many 
different prices for different products exist. Based on all these 
considerations, it was therefore expected that the confirmation bias 
would cause a significant overestimation of the real price trend. 
However, the public discussion following the value-added tax increase 
completely neglected that many convenience goods such as groceries 
and newspapers were not affected at all by this value-added tax-
increase. All these products were subjected to the so-called “reduced 
tax rate” of 7%, which was not affected by the value-added tax 
increase. This tax-based experimental variation offered an excellent 
opportunity to address another question – in how far the factual price 
development was taken into account. 
Here, it appears useful to distinguish between two different ways a 
confirmation bias may come about. First, people may indeed take the 
real price development into account, but tend to a biased weighting of 
evidence, i. e. by mainly remembering experiences, where noticeable 
price-increases were realized. This in turn may contribute to the 
confirmation of the hypothesis that the value-added tax increase lead 
to noticeable price increases. This biased weighting of evidence will in 
the following be considered as bottom-up approach. Second, people 
may not take the real price development into account at all. To be 
more precise, when asked to estimate the price increase of a 
particular product, people provide estimations, which are in line with 
their expectation that the value-added tax increase lead to noticeable 
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price increases. At the same time, these estimations are not 
correlating with the real price development. This non-considering of 
evidence will in the following be considered as top-down approach. 
The literature dealing with the confirmation bias on the one side 
provides comprehensive evidence for the bottom-up approach 
consisting in a biased weighting of evidence. One example is the so-
called my-side bias (J. Baron, 2000), which is the tendency of people 
to recall reasons supporting the side they favour on a controversial 
issue and not to recall reasons supporting the other side (Nickerson, 
1998). Another example is found in a classical study by Lord, Ross & 
Lepper (1979), showing that people with initially conflicting views on 
death penalty can examine the same evidence and both find reasons 
for increasing the strength of their existing opinions. Nonetheless, in 
all these cases the evidence – albeit in a biased fashion – is 
considered. 
The literature dealing with the confirmation bias on the other side 
also also provides at least some evidence for the top-down approach, 
consisting in a non-considering of evidence. Yet this facet of the 
confirmation bias can be observed in a study of Bruner and Potter 
(1964), who showed people the same picture on a series of slides. 
While the first slide was defocused so that the picture was not 
recognizable, the focus was made clear on successive slides. It was 
found that a wrong hypothesis formed on the basis of a defocused 
picture persisted, even after the picture was in sufficiently good focus 
and therefore an objective standard existed. Hence, people who had 
not looked at the poorly focused picture were able to identify it 
correctly. Akin to these results were findings by Traut-Mattausch et 
al. (2004), who found that people clearly overestimated prices in a 
new currency, despite an objective standard of comparison was given 
by the old prices in German Marks and the new prices in euro. This 
was explained by expectations of price increases after the euro 
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transition. The subsequent question arises, which of the two 
approaches appears appropriate in the case of the current study. 
There is no definite answer to this question. Nonetheless, when 
asking people about their price increase judgements for particular 
products, these two approaches make different predictions. According 
to the bottom-up approach, people would overweight their price 
increase experiences with particular products and neglect non price 
increase experiences with other products. Nonetheless, when asked 
for the price increases for specific products people should be able to 
provide price increase estimations, which are at least rudimentary 
within the boundaries of the factual price development. Hence, in a 
study by Perkins, Farady, and Bushey (1991) dealing with the my-
side bias the participants in fact were capable of generating reasons 
for holding a view counter to their own when explicity asked to do so. 
Analogue, people should be able to provide roughly accurate price 
increase estimations.  
On the other hand, according to the top-down approach, people 
would ignore the real price development and therefore provide price 
increase estimations in accordance with their belief that the value-
added tax increase lead to noticeable price increases. This could also 
be pandered by a low price knowledge of German consumers 
(Evanschitzky, Kenning, & Vogel, 2004). Given low price knowledge, it 
would appear possible that people are not even capable of using the 
real prices for a comparison. This in turn would allow for an 
assimilation of the price increase judgements to the belief, that the 
value-added tax increase lead to noticeable price increases.  
Because until now little research on the confirmation bias has been 
done in real-world settings, it seemed desirable to examine in how far 
it can be applied to a real-world event such as the value-added tax 
increase in Germany. Accordingly, two surveys were carried out two 
months before and after the value-added tax increase, where the 
participants had to judge the actual, prospective and past prices for 
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eight different products. By this procedure we sought to examine, if 
people tend to overestimate the factual price development and if the 
confirmation bias is based on a bottom-up or top-down approach. 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
The sample was recruited with randomized phone numbers, which 
were provided by the ZUMA (Zentrum fuer Umfragen, Methoden und 
Analysen, Mannheim), based on the Gabler-Haeder-Design (Haeder & 
Gabler, 1998). This design is assumed to allow for the drawing of a 
statistical representative sample of the German population. To 
control for systematical errors when contacting households, the last 
birthday principle was applied. Using these procedures, N = 453 
participants could be recruited successfully for the first survey. 
Thereof, N = 307 participants could then be successfully recruited for 
the second survey and clearly assigned to the measurements from the 
first survey. Compared to the distribution in the German population, 
female participants were slightly overrepresented (n = 174, 56.4%). 
The mean age of the participants was 43 years, SD = 15.21, thus 
almost perfectly equalling the age distribution in the German 
population. The different federal states were approprietely 
represented. One-person households were slightly overrepresented, 
whereas remaining socioeconomic attributes such as income and 
education were close to the distribution in official statistics. On the 
whole, it appeared that in fact a statistical representative sample of 
the German Population was recruited. 
4.2.2. Procedure 
Sixteen advanced students of economics, business administration 
and psychology, who participated in a practical course in research 
methodology, served as interviewers. Before the survey, these 
students were extensively familiarized with survey techniques and the 
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particularities of telephone interviews. Furthermore, they were 
extensively familiarized with the questionnaire and afterwards 
practiced the interview situation in role plays under supervision of 
the first author. Then a pretest with N = 70 participants was carried 
out, which on the one hand ought to uncover possible weaknesses of 
the questionnaire and on the other hand ought to allow the students 
a real practice in the field. After this pretest, the experiences and 
difficulties when interviewing were extensively discussed. Afterwards, 
the field phase started. 
The first survey has been carried out in November 2006. The 
interviewers introduced themselves as employees of the University of 
Cologne, who were doing a survey on the value added tax increase. 
They told the participants that the survey was aiming at finding out, 
what people think of the value-added tax increase and what they 
expect. Then the participants were told that they were selected by 
random. After the participants agreed to participate in the study, the 
survey started. 
First, the participants were asked, if they believed that the value-
added tax increase would lead to price increases. Second, the 
participants were asked to estimate the current prices and the prices 
after the value-added tax increase is realised for eight different 
products. These products were preselected according to the two 
criteria in how far the product categories are affected by the value 
added tax increase and the expected purchase frequency.  
Table 7: Classification of the eight Products 
 
Affected by the Value-added Tax Increase 
 
 
Expected Purchase 
Frequency 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
High 
 
Toothpaste, orange juice 
 
Butter, newspapers 
Low Shoe polish, multi purpose 
cleaner 
Sugar, vinegar 
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Table 7 summarizes this classification. The products toothpaste, 
orange juice, shoe polish and multi purpose cleaner were affected by 
the value-added tax increase, whereas the products butter, 
newspapers, sugar and vinegar were subject to the so-called reduced 
tax rate and therefore not affected.  
A closer look at Figure 4 shows the factual price increases for these 
products.  
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Figure 4: Percentaged Estimations by the German Federal Statistical Office 
(DESTATIS) of the Price Increases from October 2006 to February 2007  
 
It was found that the prices for multi purpose cleaner, tooth paste, 
vinegar, butter and sugar practically did not increase at all. On the 
other hand, a decent increase for shoe polish and a comparatively 
strong increase for newspapers (3.2%) and orange juice (3.4%) was 
observed. It has to be mentioned that this price development was not 
quite as expected, because the prices for tooth paste and multi 
purpose cleaner, which were affected by the value-added tax increase, 
remained stable. At the same time, the prices for newspapers, which 
were not affected by the value-added tax increase, went off. 
Nonetheless, because the average price increases for the affected 
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products (1.38%) were still higher than for the non affected products 
(0.89%), this classification was also used for the second survey. On 
the whole, the average price increases for the eight products used in 
this study by 1.13% almost perfectly equalled the increase of the 
consumer price index by 1.0% in the period from October 2006 to 
February 2007.  
The expected purchase frequency was derived from plausibility 
considerations. Nonetheless, in this first survey the factual purchase 
frequency was also measured on a 5-point scale (1 = never, 5 = often). 
It was found that the products with an expected low purchase 
frequency in fact had a significantly lower purchase frequency (M = 
2.27, SD = 0.70) than the products with an expected high purchase 
frequency, M = 3.28, SD = 0.81, t(306) = 21.52, p < .01. The order of 
these two question types – total judgement and price increase 
expectations for the different products was randomized in order to 
control for sequence effects. However, no such sequence effects were 
observed.  
Afterwards, various attitude and personality scales were measured, 
whose results will not be discussed in this article. Then, the 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics were captured. 
Finally, the participants were thanked and they were asked, if they 
agreed to participate in a second survey in February 2007. In case of 
compliance, they were finally asked for their first name to make sure, 
that the “right” participant is questioned in the second survey. On 
request, they were given the phone number of the first author to 
allow for questions and complaints.  
The second survey has been carried out in February 2007. The 
participants were reminded of their first participation in the year 
2006 and told that they had agreed to participate in this survey. 
Then, the participants were asked to estimate the current prices and 
the prices before the value-added tax increase was realised for the 
eight products. Afterwards, they were asked to judge on a 5-point 
75 
scale, how often they purchased the eight products after the value-
added tax increase (1 = never, 5 = often). Finally, the participants 
were asked for their first name again and thanked for their 
participation in the second survey. 
To sum up, two surveys were carried out two months before and after 
the value-added tax increase, respectively. The participants had to 
judge the actual, prospective or past prices. This procedure was used 
in order to get an insight into the confirmation bias in a real world 
setting. 
4.2.3. Results 
4.2.3.1. First survey before the value-added tax increase 
It was first expected that people would tend to overestimate the 
consequences of the value-added tax increase. To capture the 
anticipated price increases (API), the mean expected prices for the 
different products after the tax increase (PE1) were related to the 
mean estimated current prices for the different products before the 
tax increase (P0), according to the following formula: 
API = 100(PE1 – P0)/ P0         (1) 
As expected, the factual price development measured by the German 
Federal Statistical Office (1.13%) was drastically overestimated with a 
mean API of 10.25%, SD = 8.78. 
A subsequent question was in how far people anticipated the 
prospective differences for the different tax rates. Here, a closer 
analysis for the products which were affected by the value-added tax 
increase (tooth paste, shoe polish, orange juice and multi purpose 
cleaner) and not affected (butter, newspapers, sugar and vinegar), 
respectively, revealed that people did not anticipate the different price 
developments for the different tax rates at all. This is shown in a 
mean API of 10.14% (SD = 8.41) for the affected products compared 
to 10.42% (SD = 10.31) for the non affected products, t(306) = 0.76, 
not significant.  
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Hence, people expected a substantial price increase for all products, 
detached from the fact if products were affected by the value-added 
tax increase or not. Now it was expected that the confirmation bias 
contributes to a perpetuation of the belief that the value added tax 
increase lead to significant price increases in the light of 
disconfirming evidence. For this reason, the same subjects were 
questioned again two months after the value added-tax increase. 
 
4.2.3.2.  Second survey after the value-added tax 
increase 
The first question was if people – after the value-added tax increase 
was realized - would tend to overestimate the modest factual price 
development of 1.13%. To measure the experienced price increases 
(EPI), the mean estimated current prices for the different products 
after the tax increase (P1) were related to the mean remembered 
prices for the different products before the tax increase (PR0), 
according to the following formula: 
EPI = 100(P1 – PR0)/ PR0         (2) 
As expected, the factual price development (1.13%) was clearly 
overestimated with mean EPI of 5.27%, SD = 6.77. Nonetheless it has 
to be noted that the mean EPI after the value-added tax increase was 
significantly lower than the mean API before the value-added tax 
increase (M = 10.25%, SD = 8.78), t(306) = 9.28, p < .01, d = .64. 
Hence, albeit the participants still clearly overestimated the factual 
price development, a noticeable adjustment was observed. 
A subsequent question was, if people noticed the different price 
developments for the products which were affected (tooth paste, shoe 
polish, orange juice and multi purpose cleaner) and not affected 
(butter, newspapers, sugar and vinegar) by the value-added tax 
increase. Comparing the EPI for the affected products (M = 5.98%, SD 
= 6.94) with the non-affected products (M = 4.92%, SD = 7.81), t(303) 
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= 2.66, p < .01, d = .14, it is in fact denoted that people did anticipate 
the different price developments. However, this slight effect should 
not be overinterpreted, because a closer comparison of the factual 
price increases by the German Federal Statistical Office and the 
experienced price increases by the participants indicates that 
objective and subjective price developments practically have nothing 
in common.  
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Figure 5: Factual Price Increases as measured by the German Federal 
Statistical Office (DESTATIS) compared to the Perceived Price Increases by 
the Participants  
 
Figure 5 contrasts these different measurements for the eight 
products. It attracts attention that only slight differences between the 
various experienced price increases by the participants are 
observable. On the other hand, for example the remarkable difference 
between orange juice and the other products in the measurements 
provided by the German Federal Statistical Office are not reflected in 
the price increase estimations by the participants. Hence, when 
comparing the estimated price increase for orange juice (M = 5.35%, 
SD = 8.97) to the price increase for butter (M = 5.10%, SD = 9.77), no 
significant difference was observed, t(279) = 0.41. Here the official 
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statistical data by the German Federal Statistical Office tell a different 
story. Whereas the prices for butter even decreased in the time from 
October 2006 to February 2007 by -0.2%, the prices for orange juice 
were increased by 3.4%. The fact that the participants do not seem to 
know much about the factual price development is also shown in a 
nonsignificant negative correlation between the experienced and 
factual price development for the eight products (r = -.19). To sum up, 
the real price development seemingly did not play a crucial role for 
the perceived price increases of the participants. But where did they 
then derive their price increase judgements from? 
According to the theoretical considerations on the top-down approach 
of the confirmation bias it was expected that the price increase 
expectation before the value-added tax increase should contribute to 
experienced price increases after the value added tax increase. In the 
first survey, the general price increase expectation was measured on 
a 6-point scale (0 = no price increases, 5 = strong price increases). 
Because the ratings were unequally distributed, this variable was 
trichotomized, yielding a low expectation group for the values 0, 1 
and 2 (n = 102), a medium expectation group vor the value 3 (n = 
133) and a high expectation group for the values 4 and 5 (n = 72). An 
analysis of variance in fact revealed a significant effect of the 
trichotomized expectations on the experienced price increases, F(2, 
304) = 8.01, p < .01, η² = .05. Figure 6 shows that the experienced 
price increases were lowest for the low expectation group (M = 3.43%, 
SD = 5.20), higher for the medium expectation group (M = 5.49%, SD 
= 6.96) and highest for the high expectation group (M = 7.48%, SD = 
7.70). A subsequent LSD post-hoc test revealed a significant 
difference for all paired comparisons, pS < .05.  
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Figure 6: Experienced Price Increases after the Value-Added Tax Increase 
depending on the General Price Increase Expectations before the Value-Added 
Tax Increase  
 
The anticipated price increases (API) were another measurement in 
the first survey to capture the expected price increases due to the 
value-added tax increase. Using a procedure very similar to the 
section above, the API were also trichotomized, yielding a low price 
increase group (n = 109), medium price increase group (n = 100) and 
high price increase group (n = 98). An analysis of variance revealed a 
significant effect of the trichotomized API on the experienced price 
increases, F(2, 304) = 28.36, p < .01, η² = .16. Figure 7 shows that 
the experienced price increases were lowest for the low price increase 
group (M = 2.51%, SD = 3.72), higher for the medium price increase 
group (M = 4.67%, SD = 5.87) and highest for the high expectation 
group (M = 8.97%, SD = 8.45). A subsequent LSD post-hoc test 
revealed a significant difference for all paired comparisons, pS < .05. 
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Figure 7: Experienced Price Increases depending on the Mean Anticipated 
Price Increases 
 
To sum up, an influence of the price increase expectations – 
measured directly with an explicit judgement of the expectation and 
indirectly by considering the difference between current and future 
prices – on the experienced price increases after the value-added tax 
increase was observed. It is therefore concluded that the experienced 
price increases in the second survey were little influenced by the real 
price development, but mainly by the expectations before the value 
added tax increase. 
4.3. Discussion 
This study aimed at examining the confirmation bias in a real-world 
context, using the example of a value-added tax increase in Germany. 
It was found that in fact a confirmation bias concerning the belief 
“the value-added tax increase will lead to noticeable price increases” 
appeared. Furthermore, the results indicated that this confirmation 
bias was based on a top-down process, because the estimated price 
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increases were practically not correlated with the objective price 
development measured by the German Federal Statistical Office.  
First it was found that in the end of 2006 virtually all participants 
were convinced that the value added tax increase will lead to 
noticeable price increases. By that an important requirement for the 
appearance of a confirmation bias was fulfilled, because a 
conformation bias requires established beliefs (Oswald & Grosjean, 
2004). A possible explanation for this widespread belief could be 
rooted in the introduction of the euro in 2002 and the subsequent 
perception of noticeable price increases, which objectively did not 
exist (e. g. Traut-Mattausch et al., 2004). It appears possible that 
people transferred their decision routine “the introduction of the Euro 
lead to significant price increases” to another context, the value-
added tax increase. This is in accordance with studies which did 
show that if people have established a decision routine in one task 
and are expected to test this procedure in another context, they tend 
to maintain this routine (Betsch, Haberstroh, Glöckner, Haar, & 
Fiedler, 2000). The possibility that people transfer certain decision 
routines into other contexts could give the top-down approach of the 
confirmation bias an even more far-reaching meaning than the one 
discussed in this study. Hence, it appears possible that the 
confirmation bias is not only based on expectations, which have such 
a strong impact that objective evidence is ignored. It appears possible 
that a confirmation bias results from superior belief-systems, which 
are applied in different contexts. This could be explored in further 
studies, controlling for such belief systems.  
Another requirement for the appearance of the confirmation bias was 
the lack of an objective standard (Traut-Mattausch et al., 2004). 
Interestingly, such an objective standard exists – if one takes the 
measurements by the German Federal Statistical Office for granted. 
Contrasting the experienced price increases for the various products 
with the factual price increases revealed that his objective standard 
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did not seem to play a crucial role for the price increase judgements 
after the value-added tax increase. Nonetheless it has to be conceded 
that the experienced price increases were clearly lower than the 
anticipated price increases. Research dealing with motivated 
reasoning coined the term reality constraints (Kunda, 1990) to 
indicate limits of biased cognition. According to our findings it 
appears that these reality constraints are quite stretchable in real-
world settings, but only within certain boundaries. One possible 
theoretical explanation is found in the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Accordingly, the remarkable 
anticipated price increases served as anchor, which was adjusted by 
the daily experience that the real consequences of the value-added 
tax increase were at least not as bad as expected.  
The two requirements discussed in the sections above – established 
beliefs and the lack of an objective standard – argue in favour of 
ubiquity of the confirmation bias within the field of (economic) policy, 
because political measures in general are accompanied by high 
complexity and ambiguity. Because lay people require clear-cut 
beliefs to find their way in a complex and obscure economic world, it 
appears most likely that many such beliefs exist which are a 
foundation for a subsequent confirmation bias. The fact that top-
down processes (as observed in this study) – which more or less 
ignore real developments – may contribute to the hardening of such 
beliefs implicates that it is almost impossible to find consent for 
unpopular political measures. This leads over into the practical 
implications of this study. 
The findings implicate that on the whole the real consequences of the 
value-added tax increase in Germany were insufficiently 
communicated. Hence, the knowledge that many convenience goods 
were not at all affected by this value-added tax increase might have 
contributed to a higher acceptance. As a consequence of this 
inadequate communication, people first expected non-existent price 
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increases. Due to the confirmation bias, these non-existent but 
expeted price increases were finally perceived. This in turn could lead 
to consumer reticence with the corresponding negative cyclical 
consequences. 
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5. General Discussion 
In the previous chapters, various phenomena surrounding lay 
perceptions of economic phenomena and belief persistence were 
investigated and discussed. The aims of this final general discussion 
are threefold. The first aim is to consider the theoretical implications 
of the previous chapters and in doing so integrate the central findings 
into a broader theoretical context. The second aim is to address the 
practical implications of the central findings presented in the 
previous chapters. In this context, various recommendations for both 
economists and political decision makers are discussed. Finally, the 
third aim is to consider implications for future research. 
5.1. Theoretical Implications 
In the previous chapters, a variety of results as well as theoretical 
and practical implications were presented. From a bird’s eye view, 
two central phenomena and their interplay were examined. First, the 
phenomenon that lay perceptions of future economic phenomena are 
often biased and inaccurate, and second, that it is extremely difficult 
to modify beliefs on the economy, since they appear - even in the face 
of clearly contradictory evidence - to be stable over time. The 
interplay of these phenomena can be described as follows: Biased and 
inaccurate beliefs on future economic events are first formed and 
then remain stable, even when the holders of these beliefs are 
presented with clear evidence to the contrary. 
5.1.1. Lay perceptions of future economic phenomena are often 
biased and inaccurate 
Chapter 2 presented a series of four experiments which demonstrated 
that participants strongly tended to underestimate long-term 
economic growth. This also applied to participants with high 
expertise in estimating exponential effects. A similar, albeit opposite 
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mechanism was observed in Chapter 4. Here, participants clearly 
tended to overestimate future price increases in connection with an 
increase in value added tax. It was thus shown that people have 
enormous difficulties anticipating the development of central macro-
economic variables such as economic growth and inflation. 
This underestimation of exponential effects is not only restricted to 
the domain of economic growth. In three surveys with residents of 
New Zealand and Germany, Kemp (1984; 1987; 1991) also found that 
past prices were systematically overestimated. The reverse case of the 
systematical underestimation of exponential effects found in the 
context of economic growth can thus also be observed. Accordingly, 
the exponential growth of prices due to inflation is systematically 
underestimated, resulting in an inflation of recollected past prices. It 
would therefore appear that two central macroeconomic variables are 
subject to a tendency to strongly underestimate the impact of 
exponential effects. According to these findings, economic theory 
could improve the predictive quality of corresponding models by 
introducing individual discount rates for the anticipation of future 
growth or the perception of past prices.  
However, although it has been shown that future and past 
perceptions of these central macro-economic variables are extremely 
biased and therefore highly likely to affect macro-economic modeling; 
these considerations have yet to be integrated into macro-economic 
theory. Interestingly, integration does appear to have occurred within 
micro-economic theory. Here, the similar phenomena of time 
discounting and time preference (Frederick, Loewenstein, & 
O'Donoghue, 2002) already find consideration in the field of 
behavioral economics. While time discounting encompasses all 
reasons for caring less about future consequences, time preference 
refers to preferring immediate utility to delayed utility. Corresponding 
research indicates that the classical Discounted Utility Model (P. 
Samuelson, 1937), which suggests that all possible motives 
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underlying intertemporal choice can be condensed into the single 
parameter of a subjective discount rate, has little empirical support, 
despite its continued use by many economists. The most established 
anomaly is termed hyperbolic discounting and refers to a declining 
discount rate. It shows that when asked to compare a smaller-sooner 
to a larger-later reward, subjects’ implicit discount rate is lower over 
longer than over short time horizons (Thaler, 1981). Discounted 
utility has thus been subject to modification in order to account for 
this and various other intertemporal choice anomalies (Frederick et 
al., 2002). In order to develop descriptively adequate models, the 
same approach may be adopted when modeling inflation, economic 
growth or related topics by considering that people tend to 
underestimate future growth and overestimate future inflation. 
A major consequence of biased perceptions of future economic 
phenomena, in particular the tendency to underestimate the long-
term effects of cumulative growth, is found in the so-called fixed pie 
assumption (Bazerman, Moore, & Gillespie, 1999; Fetchenhauer & 
Haferkamp, 2007). According to this assumption, the economy is 
understood as a fixed pie, that is, the future wealth of a nation is 
perceived as stable and invariant. When it comes to distributing this 
wealth, people are convinced that the gain of one group can only 
occur at the loss of another group. Examples of beliefs embodying 
this assumption are manifold, for example, wealthy nations are 
wealthy at the expense of poor nations, or unemployment exists 
because foreign workers have stolen domestic jobs (Fetchenhauer & 
Haferkamp, 2007). All of these considerations, however, tend to 
ignore the fact that the economy is a dynamical system rather than a 
fixed pie. The central question of economic policy is not how to 
distribute the current pie, but rather how to enlarge the future pie. In 
addressing this question, economic growth plays a crucial role. Given 
that people are very poor in estimating long-term economic growth, 
however, it is not surprising that political measures which aim to 
stimulate the economy find little support and that people are more 
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interested in distributing the fixed pie. A biased perception of 
cumulative growth in the future may therefore also help to explain 
the fixed pie assumption. 
A further example of the consequences of biased perceptions of future 
economic phenomena is to be found in people’s tendency to 
underestimate the advantages resulting from foreign trade (J. Baron 
& Kemp, 2004; Caplan, 2007; Fetchenhauer & Haferkamp, 2007). 
Future benefits of foreign trade tend to be totally disregarded or 
significantly underestimated. People also tend to interpret trade 
volume as a fixed pie, so that everything which is exported is 
considered lost. Again, people fail to consider the positive long-term 
consequences of foreign trade, focusing instead on the present and 
adopting a static perspective which ignores dynamic processes and 
positive future consequences for the domestic country. 
Biased perceptions of future economic phenomena are also to be 
found when examining the interrelation between technological 
progress and its consequences for employment. Again, humans tend 
to adopt a static perspective and assume that there is a fixed amount 
of employment and capital which also includes the employment of 
machines (Fetchenhauer & Haferkamp, 2007). As a result of this 
point of view, which again can be traced back to the fixed pie 
assumption, each form of technological progress (new machines) is 
assumed to contribute to a loss of jobs, with machines replacing 
manpower. The idea that new technologies are able to create new jobs 
and that humans are adaptive and able to further themselves is 
completely ignored. From this perspective, it is not surprising that 
people see the creation and maintenance of employment as a central 
task for economic policy, while the question concerning the 
productivity of employment is for the most part neglected (Caplan, 
2007). It is therefore extremely difficult to convince people that 
employment in outdated industries is inefficient. This is an important 
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reason, why, for example, people tend to oppose the cutback of coal 
subsidies. 
5.1.2. Lay beliefs on the economy remain stable over time, even 
in the light of contradictory evidence 
Chapter 3 examined the reactions of economic laypeople when their 
beliefs were contradicted by an expert. A variety of reactions were 
observed which can be considered typical for the “freezing” tendency 
due to a strong need for cognitive closure and which could explain 
why lay beliefs on the economy remain stable, even in the face of 
contradictory evidence. Freezing on prior beliefs was also observed in 
Chapter 4; perceived price increases following a value added tax 
increase were strongly influenced by price increase expectations prior 
to the increase and hardly influenced by actual price development. 
The general tendency to overvalue favorable evidence and undervalue 
unfavorable evidence serves an adaptive function for the human 
psyche. Many humans would presumably not be able to cope with 
the imponderabilities of everyday life without such a system of 
psychological immunity. The same applies to belief persistence due to 
reasons of cognitive relief. Nonetheless, it is generally assumed that 
reality constraints exist (Kunda, 1990). In other words, it is not 
possible to generally conclude what one wants to conclude regardless 
of real-life circumstances. Why then, do lay beliefs remain stable over 
time, despite clear evidence to the contrary? 
One possible answer is that knowledge on the economy is 
characterized by a certain level of elasticity (Hsee, 1995); economic 
reality for laypeople is ambiguous and neither obvious nor clear cut. 
It is therefore always possible to find evidence to support any 
prevalent belief. This is true of one’s own experiences as well as of the 
experiences or knowledge of others. Using perceived inflation as an 
example, it is always possible to identify single items for which price 
increases occurred and to generalize this experience to the majority of 
products. The same logic can be applied to all kinds of lay beliefs on 
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the economy. It is always possible to find arguments (whether these 
arguments are good is another question, though it usually suffices 
that these arguments are perceived as convincing) which support a 
certain lay belief on the economy. This phenomenon has also been 
referred to as my-side bias (J. Baron, 1998), reflecting the selection 
and excessive consideration of favorable and the rejection of 
unfavorable evidence. 
A further explanation is found when examining the way in which 
knowledge on the economy and politics is usually communicated. 
While economic theory generally aims to model the economy with 
mathematical precision, it would appear questionable that economics 
as a science is unambiguously able to explain how the economy 
works (Fetchenhauer & Haferkamp, 2007). This may result in 
conflicting views. Additionally, expert information is by and large 
communicated via the mass media. Since it is a common procedure 
to invite and cite experts with extreme views, it is a logical 
consequence that the public is exposed to these extreme stances. 
This in turn may result in an availability of evidence provided by 
experts in favor of certain lay beliefs, evidence which does not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of the scientific mainstream. Referring 
to the issues dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4, it must be noted that 
both the introduction of the euro and the value added tax increase 
was also accompanied by media coverage of (alleged) experts, who 
stated that these political measures would lead to noticeable price 
increases; an opinion which was not in line with the scientific 
mainstream. This helps to explain why and how a biased research 
evaluation (Kunda, 1990) can contribute to stability of lay beliefs on 
the economy, despite clearly contradictory evidence. 
A further explanation for the persistence of such beliefs may be that 
experts are generally not perceived to be credible sources of 
information. While this hypothesis is not supported by findings from 
previous research (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981) which has 
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reported an “experts can be trusted” heuristic, recent research 
suggests that this explanation may in fact hold true (Förg, Jonas, 
Traut-Mattausch, Heinemann, & Frey, 2007). According to this more 
recent study, experts advocating certain economic and political 
reform measures induce rejection and resistance. This effect was 
mediated by reactance and low perceived similarity to one’s own point 
of view. These results may be due to a loss of reputation on the part 
of the experts, which is assumed to result from an increasing 
instrumentalization of experts by lobbies. This would explain why 
expert information is not necessarily effective in changing lay beliefs 
and why these beliefs remain stable despite contradictory evidence 
provided by experts. 
A further particularity of lay beliefs – at least for those which were 
formed without excessive weighting of evidence in favour of and 
against the accuracy of this belief – is a heightended subjective 
confidence in the accuracy of this belief. Hence, if people are less 
aware of competing viewpoints, they may be more confident that their 
selected belief is true (Kruglanski, 2004). Ironically, this a fortiori 
increases the stability of beliefs, since the high level of confidence 
provides one with a sense of security that a certain belief is right. 
This may also explain why lay beliefs remain stable and are even 
strengthened over time. 
A central consequence of stable lay beliefs is a general preference for 
the perpetuation of current states, a phenomenon which is referred to 
as the status quo bias (W. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 2005). The 
status quo is considered good. Accordingly, the burden of proof lies 
with those who want to make changes, while those who want to 
maintain the status quo do not require arguments to do so (J. Baron, 
1998). Even if there are good arguments in favor of changing the 
status quo, a general tendency to weight evidence in favor of the 
status quo in a biased manner is likely to come into play. This has 
been termed functionalism (Furnham, 1988). By emphasizing the 
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positive functions of the status quo, functionalism may provide a 
further explanation for the status quo effect. 
5.1.3. The interplay of biased perceptions of future economic 
phenomena and the persistence of resulting beliefs 
Chapter 4 examined the interplay between biased perceptions of 
economic phenomena and mechanisms of belief perseverance by 
examining the so-called confirmation bias in a real-world context, 
using the example of a value added tax increase in Germany. The 
belief that “the value added tax increase will lead to noticeable price 
increases” was indeed found to result in a confirmation bias. Global 
expectations that the value added tax increase would lead to 
noticeable price increases were thus formed prior to the tax increase. 
These global expectations were subsequently confirmed, despite 
official statistics from the German Federal Statistical Office indicating 
that no price increases were realized for many products. Results thus 
revealed that estimated and perceived price increases were practically 
not correlated with actual price development as measured by the 
German Federal Statistical Office. 
It was, however, further found that perceived price increases after the 
value added tax increase were lower than expected price increases 
before the tax increase. Since there was almost no correlation 
between perceived price increases and actual price development as 
measured by the German Federal Statistical Office, participants do 
not appear to have considered real price development when judging 
price increases due to the value added tax increase and rather 
modified their judgments prior to the tax increase. Why then were 
perceived price increases lower than expected price increases? While 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic may account for these 
findings, as suggested in the discussion of Chapter 4, the question 
remains as to why an adjustment occurred following the value added 
tax increase. Various explanations could account for this finding. 
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First, it seems possible that a general positivity bias exists when 
retrospectively judging unpleasant events. According to this 
interpretation, unpleasant events are more unpleasant before than 
after they occur. From the perspective of cognitive psychology, this is 
a proximate interpretation, with unpleasant events in the future 
appearing likely to trigger cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). In 
turn, the general tendency to reduce cognitive dissonance should 
contribute to the tendency to play down the unpleasant event. 
According to this explanation, the lower perceived price increases 
found after the value added tax increase may have been the result of 
dissonance reduction. Based on more recent research, a further 
theoretical explanation may be found in biases associated with 
affective forecasting and the tendency to overestimate the duration of 
affective reactions to negative events (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, 
Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). This in turn may have contributed to 
an overestimation of the negative consequences of the value added 
tax increase before and to more appropriate judgments after the value 
added tax increase.   
Second, it would also seem possible that judgments on unpleasant 
events are considerably influenced by media coverage and how 
frequently and controversially these topics are discussed. According 
to this explanation, changes in media coverage (less coverage in 
general on the value added tax increase, moderate reports on its 
consequences, etc.) may have contributed to lower perceived price 
increases following the value added tax increase. How is this 
interpretation compatible with the finding in Chapter 3, that lay 
beliefs on the economy are stable over time? In order to answer this 
question, it should be noted that stability is stronger for beliefs which 
are meaningful to the individual (e.g., Kruglanski, 1989). It would, 
however, at least seem questionable whether all lay beliefs on the 
economy are really meaningful to their holder. Given a lack of 
personal significance, some lay beliefs may thus be less stable than 
the belief that the euro introduction lead to significant price 
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increases, which was observed in Chapter 3. In line with this 
argument, the stability of the belief that the introduction of the euro 
was inflationary may have been fostered by the fact that the 
Deutschmark had served as a symbol of national pride and identity 
and had therefore been meaningful to many Germans (Müller-Peters, 
1998). In displacing an important symbol of national identity and 
pride, the introduction of the euro and associated beliefs may thus 
have carried great significance for many individuals. This personal 
significance may in turn have contributed to the stability observed in 
Chapter 3. What consequences can be drawn from the insight that 
non-stable lay beliefs may also exist? These beliefs might prove highly 
susceptible to the influence of media coverage. Consequently, 
unpleasant events may be retrospectively judged differently given 
changes in media coverage. According to this explanation, the lower 
perceived price increases after the value added tax increase may have 
been the result of a decrease in controversial media coverage on this 
topic, as a consequence, for example, of the importance and 
explosiveness of other issues. This in turn may have contributed to 
the general belief that the consequences of the value added tax 
increase had not been as unpleasant as expected – which finally lead 
to lower perceived price increases. 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the reasons underlying the 
lower perceived price increases after the value added tax increase, an 
additional study was conducted. This study basically replicated the 
study design presented in Chapter 4 and also used the same 
products. The first part of this study was conducted in early 
November 2007, approximately three months after the German dairy 
industry announced that prices for dairy products would increase by 
up to 50%. This increase was primarily explained by the rising 
demand of the world market (Focus-Money, 2007). Following this 
announcement, participants were expected to anticipate future price 
increases – if at all – for butter. Since there had been no general 
announcements suggesting significant price increases for the 
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remaining seven products of the study, participants were expected to 
anticipate no or at the most modest price increases for the remaining 
seven products. 
Participants 
 Participants were 53 students of various courses of study who 
participated in a course in advertising psychology.   
Procedure 
The first survey was conducted in November 2007. At the beginning 
of the course, participants received a questionnaire and were asked 
to estimate the current and future prices (in two months) of the eight 
products used in Chapter 4 – toothpaste, orange juice, shoe polish, 
multi-purpose cleaner, butter, newspapers, sugar and vinegar. They 
were additionally informed that the survey did not represent a 
knowledge test in any form and that they were required to judge 
intuitively. Each participant was assigned a password in order to 
enable correct allocation of the data from the second survey. 
This second survey was conducted in January 2008, two months 
after the first survey. Participants were asked to estimate the current 
and past prices (two months previous) of the eight products 
discussed in the section above. At the end of the survey, participants 
were debriefed and informed about the objectives of the investigation. 
Results and Discussion 
A closer look at the actual price development between November 2007 
and January 2008 for the eight products revealed that only the prices 
for orange juice (+2.5%), vinegar (+1.7%), and newspapers (+1.2%) 
significantly increased by more than 1%, while a strong price 
decrease was observed for butter (–17.7%). It should, however, be 
noted that the price for butter had in fact increased by 45% between 
July 2007 and November 2007. The prices for the remaining products 
sugar (+0.6%), shoe polish (+0.2%), multi-purpose cleaner (+1.0%) 
and toothpaste (–0.5) remained more or less stable. 
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How accurate were the estimates of the participants? An examination 
of Figure 8 reveals relatively accurate estimates for all products 
except for butter. These were, however, the products for which no 
dramatic price changes occurred. The actual price decrease of 17.7% 
for butter went unnoticed by the participants, who instead perceived 
a price increase of 12.05%. One-sample t-tests revealed significant 
differences between official statistics from the German Federal 
Statistical Office and participants’ perceived price increases for the 
products toothpaste, orange juice, butter, and vinegar, pS < .05. It is 
noticeable that for three of these four products, actual price changes 
beyond a range of +/-1% had occurred. Differences between 
participants’ perceptions and official statistics for the remaining 
products (sugar, newspapers, multi-purpose cleaner and shoe polish) 
were not significant. 
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Figure 8: Mean Price Increase Estimations by Participants and DESTATIS 
A subsequent question of interest was the extent to which 
participants’ perceived price increases were influenced by their 
expected price increase estimates two months earlier. On the whole, a 
remarkable correlation of r(53)= .39, p < .01 was observed between 
the mean expected price increases in the first survey and the mean 
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perceived price increases in the second survey. This indicates that 
the perceived price increases in the second survey were strongly 
influenced by the expected price increases in the first survey. This is 
also confirmed when looking at the correlations between the expected 
and perceived price increases for the separate products. Correlation 
coefficients range from r(53)= .18 (not significant) for orange juice to 
r(53)= .73, p < .01 for toothpaste and indicate that the expected price 
increases two months earlier played an important role in the 
perceived price increases two months later. 
On the whole, the results obtained so far confirm the findings of 
Chapter 4 that expected future price increases play an important role 
in the subsequent perception of price increases. Furthermore, it 
would appear that real price development plays only a subordinate 
role in determining the perception of price changes. This study, 
however, also aimed to address the question as to whether a general 
positivity bias exists, according to which unpleasant events are more 
positively judged after they have happened. 
A closer look at the expected price increases from the first survey 
reveals that noticeable price increases were expected for only two 
products; a remarkable price increase of 8.49% (SD = 10.30) for 
butter, and a noticeable price increase of 3.92% (SD = 10.36) for 
sugar. A general positivity bias should contribute to more positive 
and therefore lower price increase judgments in the second survey – 
in particular in the case of butter, since a remarkable price increase 
of 8.49% may in fact be characterized as an unpleasant event. 
However, no such effect was observed. The mean perceived price 
increase of 12.05% (SD = 16.59) for butter in the second survey did 
not significantly differ from the expected price increases of 8.49%, 
t(52) = 1.55, d = .26 in the first survey. On the contrary, while this 
difference was not significant, the perceived price increase was 
tendentially even higher than the expected price increase. A further 
non-significant result was observed for sugar; the mean perceived 
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price increase of 1.84% (SD = 5.43) for sugar in the second survey did 
not significantly differ from the expected price increase of 3.92%, t(52) 
= 1.50, d = .25 in the first survey. Here, however, the perceived price 
increase was tendentially lower than the expected price increase, 
thus confirming the results of Chapter 4. 
In sum, the results therefore indicate that no general positivity bias 
exists to explain the finding that perceived price increases after the 
value added tax increase were lower than the expected price 
increases before the tax increase as observed in Chapter 4. This is 
insofar a remarkable finding, as the price increases of up to 50% 
announced by the German dairy industry also appear to constitute a 
threatening event, if not even more threatening than a value added 
tax increase from 16% to 19%. If this event was indeed perceived as 
more threatening, it should have triggered greater cognitive 
dissonance and in turn greater dissonance reduction.   
If no general positivity bias exists, however, the question arises as to 
how far the results from the present study and the study discussed 
in Chapter 4 can be explained by the influence of media coverage and 
the frequency and controversy of the corresponding discussion. 
Unfortunately, this question extends beyond the scope of the present 
dissertation and would require a closer examination of media 
coverage during the realization of the studies. The correlation 
between media coverage and perceived price increases may represent 
a fruitful topic of study for future research.  
A further explanation for the discrepant findings between the study 
described above (equal perceived price increases in the second 
survey) and that in Chapter 4 (lower perceived price increases in the 
second survey) may be found in the period between the two surveys 
in each study. While the study discussed in the sections above was 
designed to replicate the survey design found in Chapter 4, it must 
critically be noted that the period between the two surveys in the 
study above was only two months as compared to four months in the 
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study in Chapter 4. It is possible that the shorter interval between 
the two surveys in the study described above lead to a greater 
salience of the expectations from the first survey, as a result of which 
these expectations exerted a stronger influence on the perceived price 
increases in the second survey. This may be explained by brain 
effects, for example by the phenomenon of interference (Woodworth & 
Schlosberg, 1955). Accordingly, oblivion is often the consequence of 
acquiring new and similar information. A longer period of time 
between the two surveys increases the probability that new 
information is acquired, which in turn may contribute to the 
replacement of recollected prices with other, more recent prices – 
which may also be fictitious. Nonetheless, this explanation does not 
explain with which new information recollected prices were replaced; 
the results of Chapter 4 indicate that there was practically no 
correlation between real price development and perceived price 
increases. 
5.2. Practical Recommendations 
The previous section showed that lay perceptions of the economy are 
often biased; that lay beliefs remain stable, even in the light of 
contradictory evidence; and that there is interplay between biased 
perceptions and the perseverance of lay beliefs. However, none of the 
above-described mechanisms necessarily imply that de-biasing or 
changing lay beliefs is impossible. This section addresses practical 
recommendations which might contribute to de-biasing and changing 
erroneous lay beliefs. Some of the ideas presented are derived solely 
on the basis of theoretical considerations and therefore require future 
empirical investigation. Other ideas are derived from empirical and 
theoretical research in a variety of domains and may be successfully 
transferable to the context of lay beliefs on the economy. 
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5.2.1. Enabling people to think in terms of consequences and 
dynamics 
One of the central reasons for inappropriate lay beliefs is the 
misperception of the long run consequences of macroeconomic 
variables, such as economic growth or inflation, and of economic and 
political measures in general. But how can this shortcoming be 
explained, given that the human race is able to build space shuttles 
or map out human chromosomes?  
A convincing explanation for the misperception of long-term 
consequences is provided by evolutionary psychology (Barkow, 
Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). According to this perspective, our brains 
have evolved to solve problems which were prevalent in the 
environment of evolutionary adaptation. It is generally assumed that 
relatively little evolution has occurred since the civilization of humans 
(in approximately the last 10.000 years). Therefore, much of our 
mental architecture evolved in the context of hunter-gatherer 
societies, which is why our minds are best adapted to such societies 
(Rubin, 2002). However, the corresponding period was characterized 
by small human groups with little social structure, little food storage 
and little division of labor or specialization. People were not settled 
and therefore did not encumber themselves with possessions (Kelly, 
1995). A consequence of this high level of mobility was that all 
possessions had to be portable. It therefore logically follows that there 
was little need for any form of possessions which were fixed in one 
place, required prolonged manufacture, regular maintenance, or joint 
work by several people – in terms used by the economist – capital 
accumulation. There was thus little capital and therefore little value 
in developing an ability to understand the productivity of capital 
(Rubin, 2003). Consequently, there was little technological progress 
in the environment of evolutionary adaptation and therefore little 
growth. Accordingly, individuals did not observe any growth during 
their lifetime (Kremer, 1993). From this perspective, it is not 
surprising that no mechanisms were developed for understanding 
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growth or dynamical processes, given the lack of incentive for such 
mechanisms. These evolutionary psychological considerations can 
help to understand the origins of the general tendency to misperceive 
the long-term consequences of macroeconomic variables and of 
economic and political measures. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the human race is able to build space 
shuttles or map out human chromosomes despite these inherent 
limitations indicates that humans are able to overcome these 
limitations by learning. A variety of studies have demonstrated that 
learning improves the ability to deal with and more accurately 
estimate exponential processes (Dörner et al., 1997; Ebersbach & 
Wilkening, 2007; Eisenstein & Hoch, 2005; Keren, 1983; Mackinnon 
& Wearing, 1991). Furthermore, education has been found to be the 
strongest predictor of whether a non-economist shares the economic 
beliefs of the average economist (Caplan, 2001; 2002). Students of 
economics have also been found to display a higher understanding of 
the mutual gains associated with trade (Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 
1996; Yezer, Goldfarb, & Poppen, 1996). The limitations observed in 
this dissertation and other biases found when dealing with economic 
and political phenomena can thus apparently be overcome by 
learning – at least to a certain extent. 
Nonetheless, certain infrastructural specifications must be met in 
providing education on economics and politics. First, students should 
receive instruction in economics and politics. However, the teaching 
of economics currently plays a subordinate role in the curricula of 
European schools such as those in France or Germany (Theil, 2008). 
In German schools, for example, economic topics are only considered 
as one of many other topics in the teaching of social studies. Few 
schools offer economics as a specialized course for high-school 
graduates. The teaching of economics therefore does not appear to be 
attributed the significance which is required in order to help people to 
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overcome their inherent weaknesses when dealing with economics 
and politics. 
A further problem is found when examining the agents responsible 
for the teaching of economics at school – the teachers. It is self-
evident that competence on economic and political issues represents 
a central precondition for successful instruction. A recent study 
revealed, however, that teachers of social studies do not necessarily 
possess this competence (Haferkamp, Fetchenhauer, Belschak, & 
Enste, in preparation). The study examined the judgments of 
economic laypeople and professional economists on economic reform 
measures. It was found that while economists judge policies favorably 
that are considered economically efficient (lower unemployment, 
boost economic growth, etc.), laypeople focused on fairness and 
justice, following moralistic principles of not causing harm to anyone, 
creating equality, and maintaining the normatively correct status-
quo. Teachers of politics and social studies constituted a sub-sample 
which unfortunately did not significantly differ from the sample of 
laypeople, thus indicating that teachers did not think like 
professional economists. Whether these teachers are able to help 
future generations gain the deeper understanding of political and 
economical questions which is required to overcome the biases and 
limitations discussed in this dissertation is therefore highly 
questionable. 
In summary, people generally appear to be able to learn to think in 
terms of consequences and to consider cumulative effects – at least to 
a certain extent. However, as far as the infrastructure for learning is 
concerned, there would appear to be shortcomings – a current 
situation, which is nonetheless developable. 
5.2.2. Highlighting the irrationality of rational ignorance 
Weede (2003) uses the term rational ignorance to describe a 
phenomenon which may eventually lead to suboptimal political 
outcomes. Accordingly, people are generally inadequately informed, 
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as far as political questions are concerned. From the perspective of 
the individual, two reasons are discerned which may contribute to 
rational ignorance. First, comprehensively informing oneself on 
economic and political issues is costly. The psychological costs 
associated with information processing in connection with complex 
economic and political issues have already been emphasized in 
Chapter 3. Second, the votes of the individual do not exert a 
significant influence on the outcomes of elections. This results in 
insufficient information processing and unreflected and ignorant 
voting behavior (Fetchenhauer & Haferkamp, 2007). A further 
problem is that the resulting errors carry public but no private costs, 
as a consequence of which no self-correcting mechanism is activated 
to change this voting behavior (Rubin, 2003).  
Various psychological theories on information processing suggest 
that insufficient information processing can be reduced by increasing 
the subjective costs of erroneous decisions (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 
1996). Within the context of economics and politics, this could be 
accomplished by stressing the importance of the individual voter for 
the outcome of elections and the negative consequences of ignorant 
voting behavior. Nonetheless, the free-rider problem remains and it 
would appear questionable whether people can be convinced of the 
irrationality of rational ignorance. In line with this consideration, 
Chapter 2 showed that incentives were not suitable in contributing to 
de-biasing, although the costs of information processing in this 
example were indefinitely high, with participants simply lacking the 
ability to estimate long-term cumulative growth. 
5.2.3. Decreasing the costs of information processing 
A further method for changing rational into irrational ignorance may 
be found in decreasing the costs of information processing. Lower 
costs of information processing should increase the disposition to 
process the corresponding information. Rational ignorance would 
thus be transformed into irrational ignorance, since informing oneself 
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about economic and political issues would no longer be too costly. In 
other words, presenting economic and political information in a form 
which enables people to grasp the basic ideas without troublesome 
information processing should contribute to deeper understanding 
and therefore decrease the biases observed in the previous chapters. 
The efficacy of presenting information in formats which are easier to 
process has, for instance, been shown in the context of statistical 
information (e.g., Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). 
Here, it was found that the accuracy of diagnostic tasks dealing with 
statistical information was remarkably improved by presenting 
statistical information in the form of natural frequencies rather than 
probabilities. For example, information on a cancer screening test 
presented in the form of natural frequencies:  
Out of every 10.000 people, 30 have colectoral cancer. Of these, 
15 will have a positive hemoccult test. Out of the remaining 9970 
people without colorectal cancer, 300 will still test positive. How 
many of those who test positive actually have colorectal cancer 
(Hoffrage et al., 2000, p. 2262)? 
The percentage of correct answers was considerably higher when the 
question was formed in this manner, than when the test was 
presented in the form of probabilities: 
The probability of colorectal cancer can be given as 0.3%. If a 
person has colorectal cancer, the probability that the hemoccult 
test is positive is 50%. If a person does not have colorectal cancer, 
the probability that he still tests positive is 3% (Hoffrage et al., 
2000, p. 2261). 
Results indicate that the understanding of statistical information can 
be remarkably improved by presenting the information in a form 
which is easier to comprehend for recipients. It should be added that 
these results were based on a sample of physicians, who can be 
considered to be experts on diagnostics. The finding that the 
presentation format of frequencies plays a central role in the outcome 
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of judgments was also confirmed in a study in which experienced 
forensic psychologists and psychiatrists were asked to judge the 
likelihood that a mental patient would commit an act of violence 
(Slovic, Monahan, & MacGregor, 2000). Clinicians informed that “20 
out of every 100’’ similar patients would likely commit an act of 
violence (a frequency frame) were more likely to refuse to discharge 
the patient than clinicians who were told that the patient had a ‘‘20% 
chance’’ of committing an act of violence (a percentage frame). 
It is, however, not only the understanding of probabilities which 
depends on the format of presentation. People also appear to have 
difficulty dealing with percentages. In a study examining how well 
people understand the percentage daily value for fat on food labels, it 
was found that people did not know how to use this information and 
therefore incorrectly judged the fat content of the examined products 
(Levy, Patterson, Kristal, & Li, 2000). In contrast, people who were 
presented with the food labels were able to provide quite accurate 
estimates of the fat content. Participants were thus not able to 
translate the percentage daily value for fat into the fat content of the 
products. Nonetheless, they were capable of deducing the fat content 
of the products from the product labels – presumably because the 
labels presented the information in a format which could more easily 
be understood and interpreted by the participants. 
It seems that people appear to have general difficulties when dealing 
with numerical information. The question is therefore whether the 
magnitude of the underestimations of long-term economic growth 
which were observed in Chapter 2 would have been at least lower if 
the question had been presented in a more familiar format. This 
could have been realized by presenting data in absolute numbers, for 
example a fictitious amount of national income or changes in 
national income over the next few years. Furthermore, the use of 
graphical figures might have contributed to a better understanding of 
the exponential processes and lead in turn to a lower magnitude of 
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underestimation. The same idea could also have been applied to the 
value added tax increase. It would appear plausible that 
communicating the consequences of the value added tax increase 
using examples with absolute numbers could result in lower expected 
price increases, since a translation into absolute price increases 
would clarify that these were far lower than the expected price 
increases reported in Chapter 4. It may also be possible to take 
advantage of the self-reference effect (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977) 
by highlighting the individual and personal consequences of price 
increases, by, for example, numeralizing the additional expenses for 
weekly food purchases, etc. 
A further implication for economists in decreasing the costs of 
information processing for laypeople is that the knowledge base of 
laypeople should be appropriately considered. For example, in 
convincing listeners or readers that a particular reform measure is 
efficient, an economist must first convince them that efficiency 
differences exist between different reform measures. Economists 
must thus begin their line of reasoning one step further back than 
they are used to (Rubin, 2003). As mentioned above, economic 
laypeople tend to understand the economy as a fixed pie. According 
to laypeople and using tax policies as an example, different policies 
serve to allocate a fixed burden among various classes of taxpayer. 
The central criterion for the distribution of this burden is fairness 
(Haferkamp & Fetchenhauer, 2007). Economists, on the other hand, 
would argue that different tax policies have specific implications for 
employment, saving and investments in the economy and that some 
policies will lead to larger total incomes than others. If laypeople 
argue with fairness and economists in terms of efficiency and 
incentives, laypeople will not understand the arguments provided by 
the economists. This can perhaps be avoided, however, if economists 
first convince laypeople that different tax policies have effects which 
extend beyond fairness and distribution. The implications of different 
tax policies could then be considered in a second step (Rubin, 2003). 
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Nonetheless, it must be critically mentioned that this procedure is 
presumably fruitful, as far as “shapeable” beliefs on the economy are 
concerned. Chapter 3 demonstrated that it is very difficult to change 
established beliefs. The successful communication of economic 
concepts may, however, also help to prevent the formation of 
erroneous beliefs. 
5.2.4. Considering the functional nature of lay beliefs and biases 
in the perception of the economy 
A further promising approach when attempting to change lay beliefs 
on the economy and biases in the perception of the economy is found 
in a consideration of the functional nature of lay beliefs. The 
functions of lay beliefs were discussed back in Chapter 3 and 
included providing support when it comes to economic decision 
making. However, this is only one function. Other functions may 
include bolstering or maintaining self-esteem, ensuring group 
solidarity, or providing a social or moral framework for the 
comprehension of new facts (Furnham, 1988). This psychological 
element of lay beliefs must also be considered when discussing 
methods to modify these beliefs and to reduce biases in the 
perception of economic and political phenomena. 
A further particularity of lay theories is that they are not always 
logically consistent (Furnham, 1988; Williamson & Wearing, 1996), 
with opposed presuppositions being simultaneously held by people 
who may be unaware of, or simply not concerned by, contradiction. 
This logical inconsistency is, for example, found in the phenomenon 
of fiscal illusion, according to which people simultaneously tend to 
favor lower or unchanged taxes at the same time as a higher level of 
government services (Winter & Mouritzen, 2001). In other words, 
laypeople tend to engage in counterfactual thinking (B. Schwartz, 
2004) and therefore envisage policies which are unrealistic. This may 
in turn lead to increased dissatisfaction with policies which stick to 
the facts. A further implication is that this tendency to hold logically 
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inconsistent beliefs can make laypeople vulnerable to untrustworthy 
party platforms which promise things that – at least from an 
economist’s point of view – are not compatible. 
What are the implications of the finding that lay beliefs may serve a 
psychological function while at the same not necessarily be logically 
consistent? Looking at campaigns aiming at changing lay beliefs, an 
important consequence is that logical campaigns may be less 
successful than emotional campaigns. This could also be shown 
within the context of health education (Furnham, 1988). A further 
implication is that if the psychological function of a certain lay theory 
or bias can be determined, this theory or behavior can be replaced by 
another theory or behavior, which equally or even more effectively 
would fulfill this psychological function. This could be an effective 
approach in order to change lay beliefs on the economy and biases 
associated with the perception of the economy.  
Chapter 3 demonstrated a continued belief that the introduction of 
the euro had lead to significant price increases, even in the light of 
clearly contradictory evidence. It appears plausible that the 
perseveration of this conviction was the result of the euro displacing 
the Deutschmark as a symbol of national pride and identity and 
therefore as something meaningful to many Germans (Müller-Peters, 
1998). Based on these theoretical considerations, an emotional 
campaign, stressing the pride and identity of a common euro zone 
and its corresponding significance could contribute to greater 
acceptance of the euro and possibly to the displacement of the belief 
that the introduction of the euro lead to significant price increases. 
It would appear that a better understanding and consideration of the 
psychological function of lay beliefs may help to develop more 
successful campaigns and means of communication which aim to 
change “wrong” lay beliefs and contribute to the de-biasing of biased 
perceptions of economic phenomena. 
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5.2.5. Creating structures within which biases can contribute to 
rational and foresightful behavior 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the general tendency to underestimate the 
long-term effects of accumulated growth might contribute to the 
rejection of a funding principle, since peoples’ tendency to 
underestimate accumulated capital in the future may be 
accompanied by an underestimation of future pensions. While from 
an economic point of view the funding principle appears to be a 
necessary measure in anticipation of future problems resulting from 
demographical changes, biased perceptions may contribute to its 
rejection. A central problem of biased perceptions of economic 
phenomena is the considerable difficulty – if not impossibility – of 
eliminating these biases. So what can be done?   
If the mountain won’t come to Mohammed, Mohammed must go to 
the mountain. Transferring this to biases in the perception of 
economic and political phenomena results in the following: If biases 
in the perception of the economy cannot be overcome, structures 
must be created within which these biases do not cause harm, but 
instead contribute to rational and foresightful behavior. 
One such example where implemented structures play a crucial role 
in shaping the behavior of individuals is related to the default bias 
(e.g., McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006). According to this bias, 
people display a strong tendency to stick with the default. This has 
been shown in a variety of domains, for example, organ donors 
(Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), pension savings (Madrian & Shea, 
2001), insurance (Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, & Kunreuther, 1993), 
and internet pricacy policies (Johnson, Bellmann, & Lohse, 2002). 
In a recent study, Johnson and Goldstein (2003) explored the 
question concerning the extent to which defaults can be used to save 
lives using the example of organ donors. They conducted an 
international comparison of effective organ donor consent rates. The 
countries under investigation required either explicit consent in the 
form of “opting-in”, which meant that residents were required to 
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actively grant permission by signing donor cards, or presumed 
consent in the form of “opting-out”, which meant that residents were 
required to actively refuse organ donation. Results were rather 
impressive, showing dramatic differences in effective consent rates 
(the percentage of residents willing to donate organs) between 
countries requiring opting-in and those requiring opting-out. For 
countries requiring opting-in, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and Germany, effective consent rates ranged from 
4.25% to 27.5%. In contrast, effective consent rates ranged from 
85.9% to 99.98% in countries requiring opting-out, such as Austria, 
Belgium and France. These results indicate that the directed setting 
of a default can be used to save lives. 
In a further study, Madrian and Shea (2001) examined the influence 
of the default bias on pension savings based on a large U.S. company 
which made changes to its retirement-plan default. Under the original 
default, new employees were only enrolled in a 401(k) plan upon 
request. After the default change, new employees automatically 
deposited 3% of their income into a 401(k) account unless they 
requested otherwise. It was found that the number of new employees 
who enrolled in the retirement plan more than doubled. Further, 
most new employees invested 3% (the default), even though 
investments of up to 15% were possible. It can therefore be concluded 
that people display a strong tendency to stick with the default and 
that this default can be set by decision makers in such a way as to 
encourage rational and foresightful behavior.   
The creation of structures within which biases may contribute to 
rational and foresightful behavior is also discussed in the context of 
“light paternalism” (Loewenstein & Haisley, in press), which aims to 
improve decision making without restricting it. One example which 
takes into account the problem that many employees fail to 
adequately save for retirement and which also considers loss 
aversion, hyperbolic time discounting, and the status quo bias is the 
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so-called Save More Tomorrow program developed by Thaler and 
Bernartzi (2004). Employees are asked whether they would be 
prepared to increase their 401(k) contribution rate at their next pay 
rise. Hyperbolic time discounting is accounted for, because 
contribution rates are increased at some point in the future, thus 
taking into consideration that people are impatient in the present and 
want to spend money now. Loss aversion is also accounted for, since 
increases in contribution rates are not perceived as losses, because 
despite these increases the employees will have an equal or higher 
future amount at their disposal. Finally, the status quo bias is also 
integrated into the program, contributing to the perpetuation of and 
increase in future savings by requiring people to actively opt-out. 
Further examples of light paternalism which are currently subject to 
debate in the literature focus on the importance of immediate 
feedback and reinforcement in the context of addictive behavior, for 
example, smoking (Volpp, Gurmankin, Asch, Berlin, Murphy, Gomez, 
Sox, Jungsan, & Lerman, 2006). Addictive behavior may be reduced 
using immediate feedback and reinforcement to counteract 
hyperbolic time discounting. As shown in a study by Schwartz, 
Bertrand, Mullainathan, & Shafir (2006), framing effects can also be 
used to promote rational and foresightful behavior. The authors 
found that contribution rates to employer-sponsored flexible 
spending healthcare accounts were higher when the decision was 
framed as an avoidance of loss (“Stop losing money now”) instead of 
as a gain (”Start saving money now”). 
Against the backdrop of these considerations, the question arises 
concerning the extent to which the findings of this dissertation can be 
embedded into light paternalism. Admittedly, it seems rather difficult 
to develop ideas similar to those discussed in the previous two 
sections for the biases under investigation in this dissertation. 
Nonetheless, a conceivable light paternalistic implication of the 
general tendency to underestimate cumulative growth in the future is 
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related to increases in contributions to social or healthcare systems. 
If, for example, a government realizes that healthcare revenue in 20 
years will be considerably lower than associated expenses, one 
possibility would be to try and implement considerably higher 
contributions in 20 years time. However, it is likely that this 
procedure would attract the resentment of future voters, which could  
result in the voting out of this future government. Alternatively, the 
government could implement a gradual and continual fixed 
percentage increase in healthcare contributions over the course of the 
next 20 years. An increase of one percent every two years would, for 
instance, generate enough to cover the difference between revenue 
and expense in 20 years time. A corresponding study could confront 
participants with both settings and investigate participants’ policy 
preferences. Furthermore, participants could be asked to estimate 
their additional expenses for healthcare. Given that people tend to 
underestimate the long-term effect of cumulative growth, it would 
seem plausible that estimated additional expenses for healthcare 
would be significantly lower in the latter than in the former setting 
and that people would therefore prefer this solution. 
On the other hand, this effect could be foiled by loss aversion and 
decreasing sensitivity (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Regular 
increases may be perceived as multiple small losses which are 
subjectively viewed as causing more harm than one large increase 
associated with loss in the future. These considerations indicate that 
perceptions of public sector revenue continue to represent a 
promising field of research. 
A further central finding of this dissertation was that lay beliefs on 
the economy remain stable, even in the light of clearly contradictory 
evidence. This raises the question concerning how this finding can be 
aligned with the idea of light paternalism. Finding an appropriate 
answer to this question would appear difficult; there is an apparent 
lack of compliance between the creation of structures encouraging 
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the formation of lay beliefs on the economy which contribute to 
rational and foresightful behavior and the requirements of light 
paternalism, namely guiding human behavior in a more beneficial 
direction while minimizing coercion, maintaining individual 
autonomy, and maximizing choice to the greatest extent possible 
(Loewenstein & Haisley, in press). At this point, I do not want to 
discuss ethical issues of interventions targeting the formation of lay 
beliefs on the economy, even though the boundaries between a light 
and stronger forms of paternalism may not always be clear-cut. 
Nonetheless, it does seem worthwhile to gain a deeper understanding 
of how lay beliefs on the economy are formed and to develop 
guidelines for political communication. These findings could in turn 
be useful in preventing biased perceptions of future economic 
phenomena, for example the exorbitant price increase expectations 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
5.3. Implications for future research 
Some implications for future research have already been discussed in 
the previous sections of this dissertation. It may have become clear 
that relatively little research has thus far been conducted on the topic 
of lay perceptions of the economy, and that it is a sophisticated and 
fascinating area of research. The aim of this section is to develop 
more concrete ideas for future research projects dealing with lay 
perceptions of the economy. 
5.3.1.  Perceived Inflation 
In light of the fact that Chapters 3 and 4 used the topic of perceived 
inflation in order to examine lay beliefs on and biased perceptions of 
the economy, it would appear worthwhile to discuss implications for 
future research on this topic. While the results of Chapter 4 and the 
study discussed in Section 5.1.3 indicated that future price increase 
expectations greatly influence perceived price increases, recent 
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research also suggests otherwise. Two conceptually very different 
approaches can be discerned in explaining why perceived inflation is 
higher than official inflation. 
The first explanation emphasizes the role of expectation. In a series of 
experiments conducted by Traut-Mattausch et al. (2004) examining 
the role of expectation, participants were asked to compare the prices 
of dishes presented in restaurant menus, in either German Marks 
before or in euro after the euro conversion. During conversion, prices 
either did not change, increased by an average of 15% or decreased 
by an average of 15%. In the condition of price decrease, participants 
believed that prices had not increased; in the condition of no change, 
participants believed that prices had increased; and in the condition 
of 15% increase, participants believed that prices had increased by 
more than 15%. In a subsequent study in which expectations were 
experimentally induced (Greitemeyer et al., 2005) by exposing 
participants to an online article allegedly taken from the consumer 
magazine “Stiftung Warentest”, these results were replicated. In a 
recent series of experiments (Schulz-Hardt, Traut-Mattausch, 
Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2007), these results were also replicated in 
contexts other than the euro introduction: for the prices of ecological 
and conventional products, and for the amount of rent charged in 
different cities. In both contexts, participants had prior expectations 
with respect to the results of a price comparison. People living in 
Munich, for example, were convinced that rent in Berlin was 
noticeably cheaper than rent in Munich. In this study, participants 
received offers for various apartments in either Berlin or Munich 
including information on rent prices and size in square meters. 
Results confirmed an explicit bias in the direction of prior 
expectations. When rent prices in Munich and Berlin were actually 
equal, Berlin was judged to be cheaper; when rent prices in Munich 
were cheaper than in Berlin, prices were judged to be equal; and only 
when - in line with expectations - Berlin was actually cheaper, were  
price differences correctly judged. The generalization of this 
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phenomenon to two further settings and different samples indicates a 
high robustness of the expectancy-consistent judgment bias in the 
context of price comparisons. 
The effect of expectancy confirmation in the face of clearly 
disconfirmatory evidence is explained by a selective outcome 
correction process. Accordingly, a prior belief effect can occur even 
with unambiguous price information, since outcomes of calculations 
made when evaluating evidence can be correct or incorrect. Initially, 
the distribution of incorrect and correct calculation outcomes is non-
systematic. Expectations surrounding calculation outcomes can, 
however, lead to a subsequent bias in judging the correctness of 
these calculation results. Whereas expectancy-consistent outcomes 
are accepted at face value, expectancy-inconsistent outcomes are 
more frequently and thoroughly tested. More errors in expectancy-
consistent results thus remain undetected and in turn influence the 
estimation of overall price trends. Two experiments were able to 
corroborate this selective outcome correction process. In one 
experiment, half of the participants were allowed to use a calculator. 
As expected, these participants showed no overestimation of the price 
trend, whereas an overestimation was found for those participants 
who did not use a calculator (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2007). In another 
experiment (Traut-Mattausch et al., 2004, Experiment 4), it was 
found that overestimation of price changes substantially decreased 
with increasing cognitive load. This paradoxical finding that a 
reduction of cognitive capacity lead to more accurate estimations was 
explained by the fact that the biased testing of expectancy-consistent 
and expectancy-inconsistent outcomes was prevented and therefore 
lead to more accurate outcomes. 
A second and conceptually different explanation for the phenomenon 
that perceived inflation is higher than official inflation centers on 
prospect theoretical assumptions (Brachinger, in press). These 
assumptions are integrated into the so-called index of perceived 
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inflation, which is assumed to reflect perceived inflation. This 
approach first hypothesizes a preliminary perception phase in which, 
the price of each good with which the buyer is confronted is encoded 
as gain or loss using a reference price that is specific to that good and 
irrespective of other goods. In a second step, loss aversion comes into 
play. Here, it is assumed that price changes are evaluated according 
to a value function V, with price increases (losses) being evaluated 
more highly than price reductions (gains). In a third step, the Weber-
Fechner psychophysical law is considered. Accordingly, the 
perception of a price change is a linear function of the relative price 
change, that is, price changes are perceived in relation to the prices 
themselves. Finally, purchase frequency is accounted for. The 
underlying hypothesis in this step is based on the idea that 
availability is a crucial factor of inflation perception; the average 
consumer assesses inflation more highly, the easier it is to retrieve 
examples of noticeable price increases from memory.  
All these hypotheses were tested in a recent experimental study 
(Jungermann, Brachinger, Belting, Grinberg, & Zacharias, 2007). At 
an aggregate level, it was found that average perceived inflation was 
higher for often-purchased goods than for occasionally or never-
purchased goods. Further, perceived inflation was significantly higher 
for goods whose prices had increased than for goods whose prices 
had decreased, thus reflecting a realistic perception of price changes. 
Finally perceived inflation was found to be highest for low-price 
items, lower for medium-price items and lowest for high-price items.  
Judgments of inflation were assessed using three different methods, 
which yielded different results. Only the results obtained using one of 
these methods, however, were very close to the predictions generated 
by the so-called index of perceived inflation (Brachinger, in press) - 
the central assumptions of which were discussed in the section 
above. This method employed questions such as: “12 months ago, 
500 g of coffee cost €3.49. How much does 500 g of coffee cost at 
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present?” (Jungermann et al., 2007, p. 410). It is noteworthy that this 
question format closely resembles that used in the study presented in 
Chapter 4. Interestingly, however, this study yielded other results. It 
was neither found that perceived inflation was higher for often-
purchased as compared with occasionally or never-purchased goods, 
nor was perceived inflation found to be significantly higher for goods 
whose prices had increased than for goods whose prices had 
remained stable. In the study in Chapter 4, one high-price item was 
included – namely a Volkswagen Golf. When comparing the mean 
perceived price increase of 4.98% (SD = 5.76) for this high-price item 
to the mean perceived price increase of 5.33% (SD = 6.62) for the 
remaining low-price items, however, no significant difference was 
observed, t(281) = .81. Hence, not even the finding that perceived 
inflation is higher for low-price items was replicated. Why did the 
results from the study on the value added tax increase differ from 
those reported in the study by Jungermann et al. (2007)? 
The findings from Chapter 4 indicate that perceived inflation is 
strongly influenced by expectation. The question therefore arises 
regarding the degree to which expectations affect perceived inflation 
in general. A recent series of experiments conducted in Sweden 
(Gärling & Gamble, in press) suggest that perceived inflation is not 
generally influenced by expectation. Participants were provided with 
past and current prices in the national currency, in euros and in 
fictitious currencies, whereby the percentaged price increases were 
constant for all products and the participants were required to judge 
future prices. The finding that the euro in general induces price 
increase expectations was not replicated – at least for the Swedish 
participants in these experiments. Furthermore, participants on the 
whole provided accurate price trend judgments and no effect of 
currency was observed.  
A possible explanation offered by the authors is that Swedes would 
not expect general price increases in connection with a euro 
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conversion. This finding and this explanation intermediate between 
the two conceptually different approaches described above on the one 
hand and the contradictory results in the study of Jungermann et al. 
(2007) and the findings of Chapter 4 on the other. According to this 
intermediate perspective, perceived price increases are influenced by 
expectations, given that expectations on future price trends exist (as 
in the case of the euro introduction and the value added tax 
increase). On the other hand, if no future price increase expectations 
exist, assumptions from the index of perceived inflation may apply. It 
therefore remains to be examined whether and how media 
presentation of inflation rates and future price increases influences 
perceived inflation, and how information on the general inflation rate 
(received from the media) and on individual prices and price 
differences (received while shopping) may interact. This interplay of 
top-down and bottom-up perception of inflation may represent a 
fruitful subject of study in future research. Future studies may, for 
example, include experiments in which participants are confronted 
with price changes over time and receive additional versus no further 
information on general price trends.  
One interesting assumption of both the expectancy-based 
explanation and the index of perceived inflation is that individual 
prices are perceived. According to the selective outcome correction 
process in the case of the expectancy-based explanation, expectancy 
congruent mistakes made when calculating price development for 
individual prices are not detected, whereas expectancy incongruent 
mistakes are. Likewise, the index of perceived inflation also assumes 
that individual prices are perceived. This is, however, a bold 
assumption, given that price knowledge in general is rather low 
(Evanschitzky et al., 2004). The question concerning which past, 
present, and future prices people really use when judging on inflation 
and what influences these prices – if at all prices are used for 
judgments on inflation - therefore appears justified. It seems that 
research on perceived inflation could benefit from addressing these 
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questions in more detail. This should contribute to a deeper 
understanding of the interplay between perceived or remembered 
past, present and future prices and in turn provide greater insight 
into perceived inflation. 
Various explanations exist for the retrospection of past prices. One 
explanation is provided by Helson’s (1964) Adjustment Level Theory 
which describes the formation of internal reference prices. According 
to this theory, the reference value for the assessment of a new 
stimulus results from a weighted mean of past stimuli. This suggests 
that a weighted mean of earlier prices for a respective good serves as 
a reference price or past price of this good. However, as Brachinger 
(in press) observes, there are to date no specific studies aimed at 
elucidating the issue of how far back the periods stretch to which 
reference prices refer. A further question of interest is how far 
recollections of past prices are distorted by present prices. As 
suggested by Kemp (1987), it appears possible that interference 
effects may contribute to a replacement of past prices with current 
prices. This should in particular be the case for products with a high 
purchase frequency, which contradicts the index of perceived 
inflation assumption that perceived inflation is higher for products 
with high purchase frequency. A further important theoretical 
implication for the perception of past prices was presented in Chapter 
2; the underestimation of exponential effects should in turn 
contribute to an overestimation of past prices. Future research 
should thus address the question concerning how past prices are 
calculated. There is presently a multitude of different explanations 
requiring further systematic inquiry.  
With regard to the perception of present prices, it appears worthwhile 
to systematically consider price knowledge in different product 
segments. A subsequent fruitful area of research may be an 
examination of the question whether little price knowledge increases 
the chance that additional contextual information is integrated into 
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judgments on current prices. This could, for example, include media 
coverage on fair or unfair prices for various product segments. A 
further interesting question when considering knowledge on present 
prices is the time it finally takes to adapt to current price levels. It 
may be the case that price perception is comparatively accurate, but 
with a time lag of, for example, two months. People asked to state 
current prices may thus report prices from two months ago. This 
would also explain the results obtained in the study in section 5.1.3, 
in which a 12.05% price increase was perceived for butter, despite an 
actual price decrease of 17.7%. In the months prior to the 
investigation, butter had namely been subject to price increases. The 
perceived price increase of 12.05% may thus have reflected the price 
increases prior to the survey and may have been the result of a 
delayed adaptation to current price levels. This hypothesis could be 
tested in a panel-design study, by asking people to regularly estimate 
the current prices of various products over a longer period of time 
and comparing these estimates with official price developments. 
With regard to the perception of future prices, one interesting variable 
appears to have been thus far completely neglected, at least within 
research on perceived inflation: the perceived fairness of price 
increases. This is insofar interesting as perceived fairness plays a 
central role in lay judgments on economic and political reform 
measures and also leads to confident judgments on the quality of 
reform measures (Fetchenhauer & Haferkamp, 2006). The same 
applies to the perceived fairness of price increases. For example, the 
seller’s costs are an important factor in buyers judgments on whether 
a price or a price increase is acceptable or fair (Bolton, Warlop, & 
Alba, 2003). When buyers believe that sellers have increased prices in 
order to take advantage of an increase in demand or a scarcity of 
supply and without a corresponding increase in costs, they perceive 
the increased prices as unfair (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). 
In contrast, an unavoidable increase in a firm’s costs may make the 
price increase acceptable. Consumers consider, for example, a price 
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increase for snow shovels the morning after a snowstorm unfair, but 
do not view an increase in grocery prices after an equivalent increase 
in wholesale prices as unfair. The question is thus raised as to how 
far the perceived fairness of price increases may influence expected 
future prices. Given that mood influences information processing 
(Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991) and that unfair price increases 
should contribute to stronger negative emotions (Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 
2004), a tendency to overestimate unfair price increases and to 
underestimate fair price increases may exist. In line with these 
considerations, it has also been demonstrated that negative affect 
associated with a particular currency may in itself cause prices in 
this currency to appear more expensive (Przybyszewski & Tyszka, 
2007). A further consideration of fairness aspects could yield new and 
interesting insights into the phenomenon of perceived inflation. 
The discussion on perceptions of past, present and future prices 
underscores the necessity of additional research in order to obtain 
reliable measurements of these price perceptions. This in turn should 
contribute to a deeper understanding of the interplay between 
remembered and perceived prices, which may finally result in more 
accurate estimations of and additional insight into the origins of 
perceived inflation.  
A subsequent question of interest is how different elements (past, 
present and future prices of different products, general expectations 
on future price increases, further effects) are integrated into an 
overall judgment of perceived inflation. Recent research suggests that 
enormous difficulties arise in connection with the occurrence of 
random price changes for single products which are not in line with 
the general price trend. As a reminder, in a recent study by Gärling 
and Gamble (in press), participants were confronted with past and 
present prices of different products and were requested to estimate 
future prices. Furthermore, various currencies were used. Given 
equal price development for all products, inflation estimations proved 
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quite accurate. However, in one experiment (Gärling & Gamble, in 
press, Experiment 5), product-specific random price changes were 
included, with the consequence that participants were less able to 
detect common percentage increases. Furthermore, only in this 
condition was an influence of currency in terms of a compression 
effect (e.g., Dahaene, 1992) observed, indicating that expected future 
prices decreased with increasing currency unit, assumedly because 
the inflation rate is perceived as higher for a small currency unit 
(larger numbers) than for a large currency unit (smaller numbers). 
It therefore appears that information processing becomes increasingly 
costly with random price changes; changes which however reflect 
reality outside of the laboratory, since inflation rarely entails a 
general trend of price development across different products. It was 
argued in Chapter 3 that from a psychological perspective, 
information processing in connection with economic issues is costly 
for most laypeople. This should more than ever apply for the 
perception of inflation. The perception of price changes for different 
products should thus be generally costly. However, if this remarkable 
costliness is increased by random price changes, this should 
contribute to an even greater need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 
2004). This need for closure should in turn contribute to the grasping 
of evidence, for example previous information on a general price trend 
and anchor values, but also knowledge structures on price trends – 
such as the price increase belief in consequence of the euro 
introduction observed in the studies of Traut-Mattausch et al. (2004) 
or Greitemeyer et al. (2005) and the belief that the value-added tax 
increase would contribute to noticeable price increases, as discussed 
in Chapter 4. One important theoretical implication of these 
deliberations is that the assumption of a perception of individual 
prices, which is elementary for the current theoretical framework on 
the measurement of perceived inflation, is in fact questionable. 
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A series of experiments may therefore look to explore how price trend 
expectations are formed under such conditions of costly information 
processing and what informational cues or knowledge structures are 
used to solve the corresponding tasks. If consistent and easily 
processible media coverage is available, as in the case of the euro 
introduction and the value added tax increase, it is likely that this 
information strongly influences judgments on future (and past?) price 
increases. Of further interest is what happens when people want to 
achieve closure on the topic of perceived inflation and no 
informational cues are available on general price trends. In this case, 
the purchase frequency hypothesis from the index of perceived 
inflation should apply. Accordingly, availability would be expected to 
play a crucial role in the perception of inflation, with the average 
consumer assessing inflation more highly, the easier it is for him/her 
to retrieve examples of noticeable price increases from memory. 
In sum, a considerable amount of research on the topic of perceived 
inflation remains to be conducted and will certainly provide enough 
material for several more dissertation or habilitation projects. 
5.3.2.  The formation of lay beliefs 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 showed that established lay beliefs on the 
economy remain stable over time, even in the light of clearly 
disconfirmatory evidence. For this reason, future research should 
address the epistemic process underlying the formation of lay beliefs 
and in particular the various factors which may systematically 
contribute to the formation of biased and inaccurate beliefs. 
Both chapters revealed an important role of media coverage in the 
formation of lay beliefs. It therefore appears obvious that a systematic 
investigation of the extent to which biases in media coverage 
influence these beliefs may represent a promising approach in 
gaining a deeper understanding of the formation of lay beliefs. For 
example, research on the media bias in the context of election 
campaigns has demonstrated that editorial slant, defined as the 
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quantity and tone of candidate coverage provided by a newspaper, 
influenced candidate evaluations and voters’ decisions (Druckman & 
Parkin, 2005). The question concerning the extent to which biased 
media coverage contributes to certain lay beliefs on the economy may 
therefore also be subject to examination in future research, by, for 
example, analyzing media contents for a certain period of time and 
contrasting them with recipients’ beliefs. 
A further form of media bias is the general tendency to cite and invite 
experts with extreme viewpoints, since such viewpoints attract higher 
audience rates (Fetchenhauer & Haferkamp, 2007). A common 
procedure is also to invite experts who hold not only extreme but also 
opposing positions. This can unfortunately evoke wrong ideas on the 
general stance of the scientific mainstream. If, for example, there are 
99 experts who hold position A and 1 expert who holds position B, 
economic laypeople will have difficulty determining how 
representative these two positions are. As a result, people may stop 
trusting all experts, due to a false impression that experts are 
clueless. This in turn can contribute to ignorance or openness 
towards other - eventually untrustworthy - sources of information. An 
examination of the consequences of this media bias on the formation 
of lay beliefs could take place in an experimental setting in which 
participants are confronted with a debate on an economic or political 
issue involving experts. These experts would hold either shared or 
different opinions. After having been confronted with this debate, a 
confederate – an alleged participant – could try to convince the 
participant of a biased and inaccurate point of view. In the debate 
condition with different points of view, the disposition to accept the 
biased and inaccurate view of the other participant should be higher. 
Besides the question as to whether and how media coverage 
contributes to the formation of biased or inaccurate beliefs on the 
economy, more closely examining the agents which mediate the 
epistemic process of knowledge formation on the economy also 
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appears to be a promising approach. In a first step, it would be 
interesting to determine the degree to which the mindset of these 
agents resembles that of professional economists. One important 
group of agents was addressed in the section on the practical 
implications of the findings of this dissertation – teachers. It was 
found that when judging various economic reform measures, this 
group did not significantly differ from economic laypeople, indeed 
however from professional economists (Haferkamp et al., in 
preparation). Yet another important group is journalists. Regarding 
this group, preliminary findings are unclear. A recent study showed 
that whether journalists think more like professional economists or 
more like economic lay people depends on the issue at hand (Lotz, 
2007). This group of agents thus requires further investigation. A 
final group of interest is politicians. Given that these individuals 
carry the final responsibility for deciding on the implementation of 
economic and political reform measures, it would be particularly 
interesting to determine the degree to which their way of thinking 
resembles that of professional economists.   
With the exception of the group of teachers, this very question was 
addressed in a recent study examining knowledge and confidence 
with respect to climate change among experts, journalists, politicians 
and laypeople (Sundblad, Biel, & Gärling, in press). Experts were 
found to possess the highest level of knowledge, followed by 
journalists, politicians, and laypersons. Furthermore, experts 
expressed the highest level of confidence in their own knowledge, 
followed by journalists, politicians, and laypeople. Interestingly, the 
relation of confidence in own knowledge to actual knowledge was 
higher among journalists than among experts. A similar study design 
could be applied in the context of economic and political reforms in 
order to increase understanding on the knowledge structures of 
important multipliers of knowledge – teachers, journalists and 
politicians. 
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However, not only mass media and the multipliers of economic and 
political knowledge discussed in the section above represent 
important sources of information. Individuals and groups are not 
only to be considered as passive receptors, but also as agents of 
thought themselves, producing and communicating their own social 
representations (Moscovici, 1984) – in this context: lay beliefs on the 
economy. According to this perspective, it may be interesting to 
examine systematic differences in lay beliefs on economic and 
political issues between different groups of society. One study 
revealed that the specific understanding of inflation reflected the 
specific economic perspective of different economic agents, i. e., 
people in different positions (Leiser & Drori, 2005). When explaining 
their concepts of inflation, salaries were found to play a crucial role 
for teachers, whereas prices were of importance to shopkeepers. One 
additional question of interest may be the extent to which the 
structure of lay beliefs depends on self-interest. A study may, for 
example, examine differences in lay beliefs on old-age insurance 
between different groups of society, for example between pensioners 
and adolescents. 
When examining the structure of lay beliefs, a consideration of 
personality differences in addition to socio-demographical variables 
may also be a promising approach. To date, only few attempts have 
been made to link psychological variables with beliefs on the economy 
and biases in the perception of economic phenomena. One such 
attempt was presented in Chapter 2; people displaying a strong need 
for cognition were found to be less affected by the tendency to 
underestimate long-term cumulative growth than people with a low 
need for cognition. In a study by Chebat and Filitraut (1984), the 
relation between locus of control and political affiliations in the 
context of an economic setback was investigated. The findings 
suggest that those with an internal locus of control are more inclined 
to accept social and political changes and those with an external 
locus of control are more affected by economic crisis. The 
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interrelation between locus of control, the belief in a just world, and 
individuals’ views on the economy was also examined in a more 
recent study (Bastounis, Leiser, & Roland Levy, 2004). Externality 
and a low belief in a just world were found to positively correlate with 
left wing ideologies and economic views; a belief constellation 
indicating low trust in the business world, protest against the unfair 
treatment of workers, and support for governmental intervention. In 
contrast, internality and a strong belief in a just world were positively 
correlated with a conservative right wing political orientation; a belief 
constellation characterized by satisfaction with the economy and 
disapproval of government intervention.  
Evidence of an interrelation between the belief in a just world and the 
perception of economic phenomena was also found in the context of 
the value added tax increase reported in Chapter 4. Here, 
participants with a strong personal belief in a just world (Dalbert, 
1999) expected and perceived lower price increases following the 
value added tax increase. These participants additionally indicated 
feeling less affected by the consequences of the value added tax 
increase (Christandl & Fetchenhauer, in preparation-b). 
Nonetheless, there appear to be more psychological variables 
requiring further investigation considering lay peoples’ perception of 
economic and political phenomena. Since fairness is an important 
criterion for laypeople judging the advantages or disadvantages of 
economic and political reform measures, a consideration of 
interindividual differences in the perception of justice would seem 
fitting. An appropriate measure may be the Justice Sensitivity Scale, 
which assumes consistent and stable interindividual differences in 
the perception of justice (Schmitt, 1996). Given that many economic 
and political reform measures deal with problems of redistribution in 
some form or another, an examination of the degree to which the 
perception of these measures – and the formation of associated 
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beliefs – is influenced by interindividual differences on the various 
dimensions of the Justice Sensitivity Scale may be of interest. 
The perception of the economy and economic policies should also 
depend on individual judgments concerning the extent to which 
various reform measures facilitate the realization of elementary goals, 
such as well-being. Whether a particular reform measure is perceived 
as an adequate means of realizing such elementary goals should 
depend on regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997). People fundamentally 
differ with respect to the so-called promotion focus which 
incorporates aims associated with the realization of one’s own wishes 
and longings, and the so-called prevention focus which emphasizes 
security and maintaining the status quo. The influence of 
dispositional differences on regulatory focus has been demonstrated 
in a variety of domains, for example for negotiations (Galinsky, 
Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 2005) and product perception 
(Werth & Förster, 2007). Implications of individual differences in 
regulatory focus may be examined in a broad variety of economic and 
political contexts, including the acceptance of reform measures, aims 
to change the status quo, economic views, the understanding and 
perception of markets, and so forth. On the whole, it appears that 
personality psychology has yet to fully enter the domain of economic 
policy and the perception of the economy. 
5.3.3.  Perception of the economy and economic policy 
In the section on practical recommendations, a number of ideas were 
discussed which could contribute to more accurate perceptions of the 
economy and more rational and foresightful behavior. In line with the 
idea of decreasing the costs of information processing, one 
conceivable goal may be the development of a “language for 
laypeople”. This language should look to anticipate that many issues 
are better understood when presented in adequate formats. Many 
economic phenomena deal with percentages and dynamic processes. 
Future research could address the question as to which formats 
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could contribute to a less biased perception of economic and political 
phenomena. It was, for instance, shown that presenting statistical 
information in the form of natural frequencies instead of probabilities 
results in considerably greater understanding. The role of format 
should, for example, also be considered with respect to the 
presentation of growth or inflation rates, changes in 
sociodemography, and so forth. 
A further question of interest lies in the “design” or “packaging” of 
economic policies. Frequently, the acceptance or denial of a reform 
measure is also a question of packaging. In a study by Haferkamp & 
Fetchenhauer (in preparation), different framings of the same item 
were found to yield different rates of acceptance. While the item 
“people with children should pay lower social security contributions 
than people without children” yielded an acceptance of 73%, the 
reversed item “people without children should pay higher social 
security contributions than people with children” yielded an 
acceptance of only 45%. A similar result was found in a survey of 
citizens in France, Germany, Italy and Spain regarding their welfare 
states and various reform options (Boeri, Börsch-Supan, & Tabellini, 
2001). In anticipating future changes in the age structure of the 
population and reducing pension burdens for future generations, one 
idea is a shift towards the funding principle. According to this 
principle, current workers are allowed to opt out of the current pay-
as-you-go system, as a result of which they pay in lower 
contributions while working in exchange for agreeing to receive lower 
benefits in retirement. This should considerably reduce the pension 
burden for future generations of workers. In the survey, participants 
were asked how willing they would be to opt out. Willingness to opt 
out was found to be considerably higher when the question was 
framed in a slightly modified manner which included some moral 
persuasion in the form of the phrase: “if it would help the generation 
of our children and grandchildren not to have to pay contributions 
which are even higher” (Boeri et al., 2001). It can therefore be 
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concluded that the acceptance or denial of economic and political 
reform measures is often just a question of framing.   
The idea of using language in such a way as to identify formulations 
or framings which may contribute to higher acceptance of important 
and sensible reform measures and in turn to more rational and 
foresighted behavior is compatible with the idea of light paternalism. 
An interesting implication for future research may therefore include 
an integration of considerations on both economic necessities and 
biases in perception of the economy, with the aim of developing 
economic and political reform packages which are likely to find the 
acceptance of the voters and in doing so contribute to more rational 
and foresightful behavior. 
5.3.4.  Intercultural aspects 
Since culture in itself represents an important variable, future 
research could also address intercultural aspects of biases in 
perceptions of the economy and in the structure of lay beliefs. A more 
detailed investigation of the culture variable appears promising for 
two reasons. 
First, cultures differ in terms of economic conditions. These 
conditions should in turn influence cultural beliefs on the economy. 
For example, one study addressing national differences in economic 
beliefs and their associations with national indicators (Allen, Ng, & 
Leiser, 2005) found that people in nations with less civil social capital 
and more governmental social capital (social capital = institutions 
such as laws etc.) display greater economic self-efficacy and more 
favorable views of the business world. An interesting question for 
future research may therefore be how far beliefs on the economy are 
influenced by national indicators – although the direction of 
causation may also be reversed with beliefs on the economy 
influencing the efficacy of economies and in turn national indicators. 
Of further interest is the degree to which biases in the perception of 
the economy are influenced by economic conditions. For example, 
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Keren (1983) found that Israeli participants who had been regularly 
exposed to higher inflation rates were less subject to the 
underestimation of exponential effects than Canadian participants 
who had regularly been faced with lower inflation rates. The authors 
pointed to a higher level of experience on the part of the Israeli 
participants in dealing with exponential effects due to a higher 
inflation rate as an explanation of these findings. However, since 
participants were solely required to judge future prices, it at least 
appears possible that the respective inflation rate served as an 
anchor for participants’ judgments. The plausibility of this 
consideration is strengthened by the fact that target knowledge 
activated by the anchor is primarily drawn upon when it is perceived 
as being applicable to the judgment which is to be made (Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997). It does not seem far-fetched to consider the 
inflation rate which is currently applicable when judging future 
prices. According to this interpretation, Israeli participants thus did 
not provide better estimates due to more experience, but rather by 
accident, because they used an anchor value which was higher. This 
example clarifies that the question concerning how far biases in the 
perception of macroeconomic variables (e.g., inflation, economic 
growth etc.) are influenced by intercultural differences could prove 
fruitful in future research. 
Second, cultures not only differ in terms of economic conditions, but 
also with respect to cultural values (Hofstede, 2001). One question of 
interest is thus the extent to which differences in the structure of lay 
beliefs can be observed between individualistic cultures such as the 
USA and collectivistic cultures such as Japan. Collectivistic cultures 
would be expected to foster consensus strivings within their 
members, whereas this should apply to a lesser extent to 
individualistic cultures (Kruglanski, 2004). This in turn may be 
reflected in the homogeneity of lay beliefs on the economy. In 
investigating whether lay beliefs on the economy are more 
homogeneous in individualistic as compared with collectivistic 
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cultures, a plausible and particularly relevant hypothesis to be tested 
would be that economic and political reform measures are easier to 
enforce in a culture which allows for a broader variety of lay beliefs. 
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